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ABSTRACT 
Differences in labour force attachment across gender are important to explain the extent of the gender 
earnings gap. However, measures of women's professional experience are particularly prone to errors 
given discontinuity in labour market participation. For instance, the classical Mincerian approach uses 
potential experience as a proxy for actual experience due to lack of appropriate data. Such biases in the 
estimates cannot be ignored since the returns to human capital are used in the standard decomposition 
techniques to measure the extent of gender-based wage discrimination. Matching two original surveys 
conducted in Madagascar in 1998 - a labour force survey and a biographical survey enabled us to 
combine the original information gathered from each of them, particularly the earnings from current 
employment and the entire professional trajectories. Our results lead to an upward reappraisal of 
returns to experience, as potential experience always exceeds actual experience, for both males and 
females. In addition, controlling for further qualitative aspects of labour force attachment, we obtain a 
significant increase in the portion of the gender gap explained by observable characteristics. 
Key words: Gender earnings gap, decompositions, discrimination, returns to human capital, sectoral 
participation, sample selectivity, biographical survey data, Madagascar 
JEL Code: J24, J31, O12. 
RESUME 
Les différences constatées dans la participation au travail des hommes et des femmes peuvent en partie 
expliquer les disparités de revenus. Cependant, l’expérience professionnelle des femmes est 
particulièrement sujette aux erreurs de mesures du fait des interruptions répétées qui jalonnent leur 
parcours professionnel. Faute de données appropriées, la grande majorité des études sur ce thème doit 
se contenter d’approcher l’expérience effective dans l’emploi par l’expérience potentielle. Ces erreurs 
de mesure sont d’autant plus gênantes que les rendements du capital humain sont ensuite mobilisés par 
les techniques standard de décomposition pour apprécier l’ampleur des discriminations salariales 
suivant le genre. L’appariement de deux enquêtes réalisées à Madagascar en 1998 – une enquête 
emploi et une enquête biographique, nous permet de combiner les informations des deux sources, 
notamment les revenus du travail de la première et l’ensemble de la trajectoire professionnelles de la 
seconde. Nos résultats conduisent à une réévaluation à la hausse des rendements de l’expérience, aussi 
bien pour les hommes que pour les femmes. De plus, la part de l’écart de revenus suivant le genre 
expliquée par les caractéristiques observables des individus augmente significativement. 
Mots clés : Ecarts de revenus selon le genre, décompositions, discrimination, rendements du capital 
humain, participation sectorielle, effets de sélection, enquête biographique, Madagascar 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Returns to human capital have always been considered dominant explanations for labour 
compensation. Accordingly, they have been incorporated in individual wage equations by using 
regressors describing schooling and the worker’s labour market experience2. This is particularly 
important for developing countries where the returns to education are expected to be higher3. 
However, before the 1980s, it was impossible to measure human capital accumulated on the job 
exactly. Mincer (1974) had indeed already admitted that the representation of post-school investments 
was the weak point of the theoretical architecture of his model. For the model to be improved, 
professional investments had to be better specified4. He was unable to do this himself, because the data 
available at that time did not allow better specifications of post-school investment in human capital. 
As rightly underlined by Willis (1986, p.543), “the [Mincerian] earnings function represents a 
pragmatic method of incorporating some of the major implications of the optimal human capital 
models into a simple econometric framework which can be applied to the limited information 
available in Census-type data”5. The recommended estimate consisted in using the time spent in 
certain circumstances, i.e. in the firm or the workplace. Since measures of actual experience were not 
available when the major empirical developments of the original theory emerged, estimates were 
established using potential experience, calculated as age minus years of schooling minus age on 
entering school (generally 6). Refinements were proposed later, as new surveys became available 
providing more detailed information about the time that individuals had actually devoted to their 
principal employment. Hence, Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) introduced the workers' tenure in firms to 
take into account the return to specific training received. The time elapsed in the labour market is 
assumed to reflect the accumulation of general human capital. The remuneration of experience and 
tenure therefore represents the return to human capital accumulated on the job. The longitudinal data 
available today distinguishes more accurately between these two measures and enriches the 
information used in empirical studies. It is therefore not only possible to calculate more or less exactly 
the time that an individual has dedicated to work, but also to isolate the experience acquired in various 
industries and/or jobs. Nowadays, studies using this type of measure are frequent in developed 
countries, too frequent indeed to be detailed here6.  
These issues are of a great importance in assessing the extent of gender inequalities in urban labour 
markets. In industrialised countries, many attempts have been made to estimate the extent to which the 
average gender wage gap is due to differences in human capital attributes such as schooling and work 
experience, versus differences between genders in wages paid for given attributes. From the literature 
on this issue, less than half of the gap can be explained by factors such as differences in years of 
schooling and experience and tenure (Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman, 2003). However, it has been 
shown that missing or imprecise data on these human capital factors can result in serious biases in the 
calculation of the discrimination component resulting from Mincerian wage equations. 
In fact, measures of women's professional experience are particularly prone to errors given 
discontinuity in labour market participation. Often age or the Mincer measure of experience and their 
squared values are still used as a proxy for the acquisition of general human capital or for work 
experience. Potential experience may be a good approximation of true experience for men with high 
labour force attachment, but is a poor proxy for less attached individuals, especially for women or 
minority groups as they have a greater likelihood of interrupting their professional activities (Antecol 
and Bedard, 2004). Proxy measures tend to overstate women's actual work experience by not 
accounting for interruptions related to parenting (that is, complete withdrawals from the labour 
market) or, for instance, for any restrictions on the number of hours worked per week. Furthermore, 
empirical studies have revealed that experience before an interruption has a lower return than 
                                                     
2 Mincer (1993); Card (1999). 
3 Sahn and Alderman (1988), Hoddinott (1996), Behrman (1999). 
4 “[…] the most important and urgent task is to refine the specification of the post-school investment category […] to include details 
(variables) on a number of forms of investment in human capital” (Mincer, 1974, p. 143). 
5 It is interesting to note that in most LDCs, information on earnings is not available in Census-type data. 
6 See, for example, Kim and Polachek (1994); Light and Ureta (1995); Barron, Berger and Black (1999) or Myck and Paull (2004). 
 6 
experience after an interruption (Dougherty, 2003) and that women who interrupt their careers 
generally receive less wage growth prior to the interruption (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Sandell and 
Shapiro, 1980; Mincer and Ofek, 1982). Hence, the coefficient of experience in the wage equation, but 
also the coefficient of education, may be systematically biased, notably for women7. Such biases in the 
estimates cannot be ignored since the returns to human capital are used in the standard decomposition 
techniques for gender wage gaps, and therefore to measure the extent of gender-based wage 
discrimination (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). Authors have in fact argued that these measurement 
errors can amplify the impact attributed to pure discrimination (the unexplained part of the wage 
decomposition), to the detriment of the component relating to observed differences in individual 
characteristics between men and women (Stanley and Jarell, 1998; Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer, 2003).  
In developing countries, especially the poorest ones, the above-mentioned problems are even greater 
than in developed countries, particularly due to the shortage of available information. At the same 
time, gender inequality is likely to be greater, markets do not function efficiently and the States lack 
the resources for introducing corrective policies. Under the PRSP initiative that concerns over sixty of 
the world's poorest countries, policies designed to counter gender discrimination are among the 
solutions most often recommended to combat poverty (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003). 
Goal 3 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is aimed at reducing gender inequalities. 
In this article, we will cast new light on these issues by using a series of first hand surveys of the 
labour market carried out in 1998 in the capital of Madagascar, Antananarivo, under the supervision of 
one of the authors. The approach consists in matching a labour force survey and a biographical survey, 
in a view to obtaining detailed information on complete professional and family trajectories for a 
representative sample of the population. The estimated earnings functions and the resulting wage 
differential decomposition enable us to match the income from current employment, taken from the 
first survey, with the individuals' actual experience (length and type of jobs occupied, periods of 
inactivity, unemployment, etc.) over their entire life span, taken from the second. As far as we know, 
this is the first such attempt at a detailed study of this sort in Africa, which was inaccessible until now 
due to the lack of appropriate data. 
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the key contributions to literature on gender 
wage gap issues, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 presents the two datasets used in this paper, 
while section 4 discusses the main econometric methods for assessing the gender gap: earning 
functions and gender wage decompositions. The background of the Madagascan labour market and 
some descriptive statistics are considered in section 5. In section 6 we turn to the econometric results, 
obtained with alternative measures of human capital and experience. Finally, in section 7, we draw 
together the main findings and present our conclusions. 
2. ASSESSING THE GENDER WAGE GAP: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON 
AFRICA 
In the economics literature on developing countries, a few attempts have been made to estimate the 
extent to which the average gender wage gap is due to differences in human capital attributes such as 
schooling and work experience, versus differences between genders in wages paid for given attributes. 
These issues are of great importance in assessing the extent of gender inequalities in urban labour 
markets. 
2.1. Why may returns to labour market experience differ across gender? 
First, men and women differ considerably in the amount of time they work and in the continuity of 
their work experience, especially in Africa. Women are more likely to combine periods of paid work 
with periods of labour force withdrawal for family-related reasons. This affects job tenure, a factor 
                                                     
7 Indeed, it can be shown that underestimating the return to experience can lead in turn to underestimating the return to education if 
experience and education are substitutes (negatively correlated).  
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that influences wages. Second, human capital skills may depreciate during long periods of labour force 
withdrawal. Women returning to the same employer after an interruption in employment may be less 
likely to be promoted. Or, females not returning to the same employer may have to accept lower 
wages than they received prior to their withdrawal. Third, some studies in industrialised countries 
demonstrate that women who interrupt their careers generally receive less wage growth prior to the 
interruption (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Sandell and Shapiro, 1980; Mincer and Ofek, 1982). This 
may be explained by the fact that women expecting several withdrawals from the labour force may 
postpone training, or may decide to accept low-paid jobs in industries or occupations that are easy to 
enter and exit. Fourth, the timing of labour force withdrawals may affect wages. Job-related skills are 
usually acquired at the start of careers – which generally coincides with decisions regarding children. 
A significant portion of real lifetime earnings growth has been found to occur during the first years 
after graduation (Murphy and Welch, 1990). If so, the timing of labour force withdrawals may have 
important long-term implications for future earnings patterns. As a result, there is no reason why the 
pattern of the marginal returns to labour market experience should be identical in males and females' 
careers. Moreover, describing these patterns by using the concavity of a declining quadratic function 
alone – for both sexes – is an excessive or even sometimes false assumption8. 
2.2. Gender wage gap: some results for Africa 
Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999) noticed that there is very little literature on the gender wage 
gap in Africa. In fact, from a recent meta-analysis of the literature on gender wage gap decomposition, 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) evaluate that, out of all the empirical studies on the topic 
since the 1960s, only 3% stem from African data9. 
From the existing literature, there is however a wide consensus on the presence of important 
inequalities between men and women, both for salaried and self-employed workers. For instance, in 
Guinea, Glick and Sahn (1997) find that differences in characteristics account for 45% of the male-
female gap in earnings from self-employment and 25% of the differences in earnings from public-
sector employment while, in the private sector, women actually earn more than men. 
Armitage and Sabot (1991) also found that such gender inequality exists in the public sector of 
Tanzania but observed no gender discrimination in Kenya's labour market. The latter result is true both 
for the public and private sectors of the Kenyan economy. Similarly, Glewwe (1990) found no wage 
discrimination against women in Ghana. On the contrary, females seem better off than males in the 
public sector. More recently, Siphambe and Thokweng-Bakwena (2001), using data from the 1995-
1996 Labour Force Survey in Botswana, show that in the public sector most of the wage gap is due to 
differences in characteristics between men and women and not to discrimination on the basis of 
rewards to those characteristics. On the other hand, in the private sector, most of the wage gap is due 
to discrimination. Likewise, in Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire, Appleton et al. (1999) find evidence that the 
public sector practises less wage discrimination than the private sector. However, from their study on 
Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Uganda, they finally conclude that there is no common cross-country 
pattern in the relative magnitudes of the gender wage gaps in the public and private sectors10. 
Other studies have pointed out the role of occupational choices in mediating the gender wage gap. 
Using survey data from manufacturing firms in Morocco and Tunisia, Nordman (2002a, 2002b, 2004) 
shows that, ceteris paribus, Tunisian (Moroccan) females earn on average 17% (13%) less than males. 
But after taking account of firm heterogeneities (by matching data on workers and firms), Nordman 
(2004) highlights that this gender wage differential, commonly attributed to pure discrimination and/or 
unobserved individual/firm heterogeneities with standard regression techniques, can be further 
reduced to 13% and 11% if the omitted information can be controlled for. Furthermore, analyses 
                                                     
8 Indeed, Murphy and Welch (1990) noticed that the quadratic curve underestimates the marginal return to tenure at low and very high 
values of tenure. They found that a quartic earnings function might be more appropriate and is preferable in many cases. 
9 See, notably, Glewwe (1990) for Ghana; Cohen and House (1993) for Sudan; Milne and Neitzert (1994) and Agesa (1999) for Kenya; 
Glick and Sahn (1997) for Guinea; Armitage and Sabot (1991) for Kenya and Tanzania; Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999) for 
Uganda, Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia; Isemonger and Roberts (1999) for South Africa; Siphambe and Thokweng-Bakwena (2001) for 
Botswana and Nordman (2004) for Morocco and Tunisia. 
10 In Uganda, the authors find that the wage gaps in the public and private sector are comparable. In Ethiopia, there is a much wider gap in 
the private sector than in the public sector. In Côte d'Ivoire, the reverse is true.  
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including job characteristics, such as working conditions, show that workers' job preferences with 
regard to their educational attainments might be an important factor in explaining wage discrimination 
in Morocco and Tunisia11. 
Consequently, results from these case studies in Africa suggest the importance of sectoral choices, but 
also of workers' job status, for analysing differences of wage determination between the sexes. 
In Madagascar, the only study we are aware of is that of Nicita and Razzaz (2003). Using household-
level data drawn from the Enquête Prioritaire Auprès des Ménages (EPM) carried out by the Institut 
National de la Statistique (INSTAT) in 1999, the authors investigate the gender wage gap in relation to 
an analysis of the growing potential of a particular economic sector, the textile industry. From their 
earnings differential decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973), they show that both the endowments and the 
unexplained part of the wage difference favour male workers, although the latter dominates the 
former12. Second, education and potential experience (measured by age) are similarly important in 
determining the wage differential. Third, level of education and being resident in urban Antananarivo 
slightly reduce the unexplained part of the wage differential. However, no general conclusion on 
Madagascar can be drawn from their analysis as it only concerns one particular manufacturing sector. 
Another limitation of their study is that, as a result of lack of information, they proxy labour market 
experience by age and include very few regressors in their wage equations by sexes13. As 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) have shown, this may have serious consequences on the 
extent to which gender wage discrimination is appreciated (upward biased) because the unexplained 
gender wage gap can be attributed in this case to the specification error in the original wage regression 
(i.e. unaccounted characteristics remain correlated with the unexplained component of the gender 
wage differential). 
Humphrey (1987) explains earnings inequalities between men and women (in Brazilian industry) by 
several factors, including professional segregation. Other studies focus on the role of job structure. 
Looking at the heterogeneity of the labour market (public, private and informal sectors), various 
authors demonstrate that earnings gaps result from the sector to which individuals belong (Khandker, 
1992; Glick and Sahn, 1997); in this way, women's low incomes can be explained by their 
concentration in the informal sector. However, the results vary from one country to another. In 
Guinea, men's income is higher than women's in the informal and public sectors. Men's higher 
incomes in the informal sector are apparently due to discrimination against women in access to 
resources (credit) and to training. In the monetized sectors, control for the effect of education reveals a 
gender bias, revealed in the structure of the jobs occupied by men and women (Glick and Sahn, 1997). 
Generally speaking, labour market segmentation highlights earnings inequalities that can be explained 
by differences in human capital endowments and professional segregation. This professional 
segregation may reflect discriminatory practices (sexist recruitment methods, stereotypes and 
prejudice against women, etc.) based on what Bourdieu (1998) calls “male domination”, which 
prevents women from having access to certain well-paid segments or professions. 
                                                     
11 Indeed, in Morocco and Tunisia, detailed observation of workers in their workplace (Nordman, 2004) revealed that women were often 
employed for performing tasks that were completely disconnected from their skills and qualifications. For instance, the author highlights 
that it is not uncommon to find women with higher education degrees assigned to unskilled blue-collar jobs.  
12 In 1999, the gross unadjusted wage differential is about 51% in favour of males. The results of the decomposition attribute about 14% to 
differences in endowments. The unexplained part accounts for about 59% of the wage differential, while the remaining 27% is due to 
selectivity. 
13 The determinants introduced in the wage specifications are: level of education, age and a regional dummy for the urban district of 
Antananarivo. They also control for potential selectivity effects by adding the Inverse Mill's Ratio stemming from a first-step Probit 
estimation where the probability of being employed by sex is explained by the same regressors as mentioned above plus the individual's 
number of children, civil status and status of household head. In their wage specification across sexes, the R2 amount to 0.37 and 0.084 
for males and females respectively. 
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3. THE DATA: MATCHING LABOUR FORCE AND BIOGRAPHICAL SURVEYS 
The data used here has been obtained by matching two original surveys conducted in Madagascar in 
1998 by the National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) as part of the MADIO project (Roubaud, 2000): 
• the first, a labour force survey, was designed to collect detailed information on employment, 
unemployment, income and working conditions in the Madagascan capital; 
• the second, a biographical survey, followed the trajectories of a representative sample of 
Tananarivians in three different fields: migratory and residential trajectory, family and marital 
trajectory and schooling and professional trajectory. 
The joint use of these two surveys offers three key advantages for our study. First, this type of survey, 
whether on labour force or on individual trajectories, is extremely rare in the African context. Second, 
the data is of a far higher standard than that usually collected in household surveys in Africa. Finally, 
the fact that the sample used in the biographical survey was a sub-sample of the labour force survey 
means that the two surveys can be matched on an individual level, thereby enabling us to combine the 
original information gathered for each of them, particularly the earnings from current employment in 
the labour force survey and the entire social and professional trajectories in the biographical survey 
(individual's household characteristics, employment, unemployment, inactivity spells). 
3.1. The labour force survey (1-2-3 Survey, Phase 1, 1998) 
The labour force survey used in this study corresponds to the first phase of the 1-2-3 Survey, on 
employment, the informal sector and consumption, carried out in a number of developing countries, in 
Africa and in Latin America (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003; Cling et al., 2005). This system of 
household surveys was introduced for the first time in Madagascar in 1995. The National Institute of 
Statistics has repeated the operation every year since then. The sample, drawn from a stratified two-
stage area-based survey plan, is representative of all ordinary households in the capital of Madagascar. 
In each household, all individuals of 10 and over, i.e. all the people of working age according to the 
official nomenclature, were questioned about their labour market participation. The definitions 
(activity, unemployment, etc.) follow the international standards recommended by the ILO in this 
respect (Hussmann, Mehran and Verma, 1990). In 1998, for instance, of the 3,002 households 
questioned, we counted 10,081 people of working age, of whom 5,822 individuals were active wage 
earners, 361 unemployed and 3,998 inactive. For all those in work, we have a comprehensive set of 
data on the job characteristics: type of job (profession, job occupied, number of hours worked, income, 
benefits, type of contract, years of tenure), some  characteristics of the firms concerned (institutional 
sector, including informal sector, branch, size of firm, type of premises, trade union presence, etc.). In 
addition, we also have detailed data on the individuals' socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, 
level of education, ethnic group, religion, migratory status, marital status, etc)14. 
Given that the earnings variable plays a central role in our study, it is important to give a few 
explanations about how it is measured in the survey. Special attention is given to capturing income 
derived from work. All occupied wage-earners (i.e. all individuals who worked for at least one hour 
during the week preceding the interview), are asked about the monthly earnings relating to their main 
job, for the month preceding the survey. Those who are unable or unwilling to answer the direct 
question on the amount of their income are encouraged to answer a second, less intrusive, question 
where they no longer declare a precise sum, but an income bracket, expressed in multiples of the 
current minimum wage. In the 1998 survey, out of a total of 5,298 active wage-earners, 3,445 declared 
their actual income and 1,853 declared their income bracket; only 13 individuals refused to provide 
information on their income, which is in itself an indicator of the quality of the survey. Several 
alternative methods are then employed to attribute an income to those who only declared an income 
bracket15. The survey also provides an estimate of the total benefits relating to the job (sundry bonuses, 
                                                     
14 For further details, see Rakatomanana et al. (2003). 
15 We notably tried an iteration process consisting of estimating the incomes declared in bracket using the estimator stemming from an 
earnings regression on the sub-sample of individuals who declared a precise income, and then, adjusting the error term of the earnings 
regression to fit the predicted income into the declared bracket. Finally, since our main results were not sensitive to the use of any 
attempted methods, we simply opted for the simplest option (entailing no strong hypotheses) which is just assigning the mean of the 
bracket for the concerned individuals.  
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paid holidays, housing, benefits in kind, etc.), whether monetary or non-monetary, which are added to 
the direct income. As is the case in all surveys of this kind, measurement errors are greater for non-
salaried workers, particularly in the informal sector. However, phase 2 of the 1-2-3 Survey (not used in 
this article), which pieces together all the production accounts and income accounts for informal 
production units, helped confirm that the income declared in the employment survey was in fact 
coherent (Rakatomanana et al., 2003). We should also point out that, since all the members of the 
household are interviewed for the survey, we measure the total household income and can also identify 
each individual's contribution. This variable is particularly interesting when it comes to estimating the 
individual labour supply, notably depending on the income of other members of the household. 
3.2. The biographical survey (Biomad98) 
This survey follows on from the biographical survey carried out in France in 1981 by the French 
National Institute of Demographic Studies (Courgeau and Lelièvre, 1992), and in a certain number of 
African capitals from the end of the 1980s (Dakar, Bamako, Yaoundé, Lomé, Nairobi; see GRAB, 
1999; Antoine et al., 2000, 2004). These surveys are retrospective, and are aimed at describing 
different aspects of urban integration processes: access to employment, access to housing, family 
formation and demographic dynamics. Each stage of individuals' lives is related and each change of 
status is dated and specified (unions, births, changes of residence, changes in job status and type of 
employment). This type of approach helps analyse interactions between family situations and 
residential and professional trajectories. By introducing a time factor, the biographical surveys can be 
used as a complement to setting up panel data. Although the retrospective nature of the surveys can 
impair the quality of the information collected due to memory problems on the part of the respondents, 
they do have two key advantages: they are not subject to the problem of attrition, which is especially 
difficult to manage with panels, and they piece together the respondents' entire trajectories. 
The Biomad98 survey addressed three generations of individuals: those born between 1943 and 1952 
(aged 45-54 at the time of the survey), between 1953 and 1962 (35-44) and those born between 1963 
and 1972 (25-34). 2,403 biographical questionnaires were collected among the individuals identified 
in the labour force survey, using a “grafting” technique to combine the surveys. In order to obtain a 
representative sample of the three generations in question, and to enable separate analysis for men and 
women, the main object of the study, we decided to survey around 400 people for each of the six 
cohorts concerned. We therefore used a survey plan stratified by generation and by gender. The 
distribution of the final sample by strata is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 : Sample distribution by age group and sex 
 
 Male Female Total 
 Nbrs. Prob.  Nbrs. Prob.  Nbrs. % 
Birth years 1943-52 410 0.395  439 0.378  849 35.3 
Birth years 1953-62 413 0.499  425 0.505  838 34.9 
Birth years 1963-72 347 0.683  369 0.715  716 29.8 
Total 1,170   1,233   2,403 100.0 
Sources: Biomad98, Phase 1, 1998, MADIO, authors’ calculations. Nbrs : number of individuals.  
Prob.: probability of inclusion from the labour force survey. 
Biomad98 presents a certain number of advantages compared with other biographical surveys in 
Africa (Antoine et al., 2004). The sample is larger; it is more representative and the precision of the 
estimators can be easily calculated. Also, the initial approach focusing on purely demographical 
aspects was widened to cover economic questions relating to labour market integration, following a 
series of nomenclatures fully harmonised with those used in the labour force survey. Finally, coupling 
with the labour force survey provides us with precise information on the income from the latest job. 
The question of income is not covered in the biographical surveys, given that it is impossible to obtain 
details for the whole lifetime as this is far too complex to be reliable when given in retrospective. 
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The matched data allows us to construct several measures of actual (rather than potential) work 
experience: experience off the incumbent firm or main employment, years of tenure with the current 
employment, in the main occupation and in the main profession.16 Potential experience is simply age 
minus years of education minus six. Actual experience is measured as months worked at the time of 
the Biomad98 interview and is converted into years of experience. Other labour force attachment 
measures include: the time spent out of the labour force (inactivity), unemployment periods, as well as 
the number of work interruptions over individuals’ lives, from the end of school until the date of the 
interview (or from the age of six if they have zero years of school attendance). This last variable is 
incremented by one from zero each time a spell of declared work has been interrupted by either a 
period of education, inactivity or unemployment. Non-working time (unemployment plus spells out of 
the labour force) is similarly accumulated from the age of six onwards and is calculated in years. In 
the rest of the paper, all these measures will be referred to as ‘labour force attachment variables’ 
(LFAVs). 
In the data, the labour supply or paid work participation has been defined as individuals having 
worked at least one hour during the reference week and reporting positive earnings at the time of the 
interview. For those individuals who have declared positive earnings (1,928 out of 2,403 individuals), 
we have identified three institutional sectors of paid work participation: public wage employment, 
formal private wage employment and self-employment or informal sector, defined as those working in 
production units that are not registered or do not publish accounts. 
Finally, matching these two sources of information allowed us to build a unique dataset containing 
biographical-type information on the individuals’ socio-economic characteristics together with a series 
of variables on their activity, labour incomes and job characteristics. The biographical data, spanning 
individuals' entire professional careers, provides relevant information that can be used to improve 
standard measures of human capital. 
4. ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
4.1. Earnings determination 
4.1.1 Earnings functions and correction for selectivity 
Traditional gender wage decompositions rely on estimations of Mincer-type earnings functions for 
men and women. Let the earning function take the usual Mincerian form: 
iii xw εβ +=ln  (1) 
where iwln  is the natural logarithm of the observed hourly earnings for individual i, ix  is a vector of 
observed characteristics, β  is a vector of coefficients and iε  is a disturbance term with an expected 
value of zero. 
We estimate the log earning functions for the pooled sample and, then, separately for males and 
females and for the different sectors. There is no universally accepted set of conditioning variables that 
should be included for describing the causes of gender labour market differentials. However, the 
consensus is that controls for productivity-related factors such as education, experience, job tenure, 
marital status, presence of children, number of hours worked, union status, firm size (if available)  and 
location of residence17 should be included. However, it is debatable whether occupation and industry 
should be taken into account: if employers differentiate between men and women through their 
                                                     
16 For instance, we can distinguish the length of different types of labour market experience: the time elapsed with the same employer 
(tenure strictly speaking), the time spent in the same occupation (taking into account the fact that workers may have two different and 
successive occupations with the same employer), as well as the years of experience in what individuals consider as their main 
“profession” (e.g. a carpenter who has practised his or her main duties in different workshops or firms).  
17 In our data, this information is not particularly relevant as all individuals live in or close to the same area, that is the city of Antananarivo 
and its close outskirts. 
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tendency to hire into certain occupations, then occupational assignment is an outcome of employer 
practices rather than an outcome of individual choice or productivity differences18. We also 
incorporate in the earnings functions a dummy for formal training received during the current 
employment and paid by the employer. More educated workers generally receive more formal 
training19: in our sample, workers who have received formal training display, on average, 10.6 years of 
schooling against 7.6 for their untrained counterparts. Besides, introducing this variable may help to 
control for a selection effect induced by unobserved skills of the workers, since more able employees 
may receive more on-the-job formal training. 
Thanks to the longitudinal information available in the biographical survey, years of labour market 
experience, that are commonly and wrongly proxied by potential measures, are refined by using actual 
measures of labour market experience as well as other labour force attachment variables (LFAVs, see 
section 3) to take into account possible differentiated human capital depreciation (or appreciation) 
effects (Mincer and Ofek, 1982). Other independent variables include dummies on marital, religious 
and ethnic status, a dummy for the presence of a union in the current job, two dummies for the type of 
work contract (the reference is no contract), and the number of hours worked per week20. Sectoral and 
occupational dummies are also included as independent variables, but separately in the earnings 
decompositions, so as to propose alternative measures of the gender earnings gaps. 
Since labour market participation is not likely to be random, concerns arise over possible sample 
selection biases in the estimations. Strictly speaking, there are two sources of selectivity bias involved. 
One arises from the fact that wage-earners are only observed when they work, and not everyone is 
working. The second comes from the selective decision to engage in public wage employment rather 
than private wage employment or the informal sector. 
As a preliminary analysis of earnings determination between sexes, we use Heckman’s two-step 
procedure to deal with a possible endogeneity of the participation decision in the labour market. In the 
first stage, probit estimates of the probability of participation are separately performed for males and 
females. We then include the appropriate estimated correction term (Inverse Mill’s Ratios, IMR) into 
the second-stage earnings equations, for males and females respectively. The inclusion of the 
correction term ensures that the OLS gives consistent estimates of the augmented earnings functions. 
We are then able to identify a possible differentiated effect of the selection bias across gender. 
The present analysis also focuses on whether the returns to observable characteristics of a wage-earner 
differ from one institutional sector to another. However, given the over-representation of men in the 
state sector, the decision to work in a particular sector may not be determined exogenously. Apart 
from the observed characteristics of women discussed earlier (such as education, experience or marital 
status), it may correlate with unobserved characteristics of the individual worker. Like Glick and Sahn 
(1997) or Appleton et al. (1999), we use Lee's two-stage approach to take into account the possible 
effect of endogenous selection in different sectors on earnings. In the first stage, multinomial logit 
models of individual i's participation in sector j are used to compute the correction terms, ijλ , from the 
predicted probabilities Pij. The appropriate correction term is then included in the respective earnings 
equation as an additional regressor in the second stage21. 
In the empirical work, a multinomial logit model with four categories is then specified. It includes 
non-participation in paid employment (as the base category), public wage employment, formal private 
wage employment and self-employment or informal sector. In both Heckman’s and Lee’s procedures, 
identification is achieved by including various household variables (mainly drawn from the 
                                                     
18 Conversely, it can be argued that analyses that omit occupation and industry may overlook the importance of background and choice-
based characteristics on wage outcomes, while analyses that fully control for these variables may undervalue the significance of labour 
market constraints on wage outcomes. 
19 See Barron, Berger and Black (1997) on this point. 
20 Other control variables were introduced, such as five dummies for the firm size in the current job, but our results were only marginally 
modified. We decided to omit them from the analysis in order to preserve on the degrees of freedom of our models and thus the precision 
of our estimates.  
21 The presence of the additional constructed selectivity correction terms renders the standard errors incorrect. White's standard errors are 
used to provide asymptotically consistent values. 
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biographical survey), such as dummies for the status of the individual in the household (household 
head, head’s spouse, head’s children, head’s parent), the number of children by age categories 
(aged 0-4, 5-9 and 10-14)22, the household’s income per capita (without the individual’s contribution), 
the inverse of the dependency ratio (number of working individuals divided by the total number of 
individuals in the household), a material wealth proxy23, father and spouse’s education, spouse’s 
religion and ethnicity, dummies for the status of the individual vis-à-vis his/her housing (owner, 
tenant, harboured) and whether housing receives electricity. From the biographical data, it is also 
possible to test whether past events, and particularly their order of occurrence, can influence 
individuals’ situations with respect to the labour market at the time of the interview. For instance, we 
identified whether individuals were already married before getting their first job and added a dummy 
in the participation equations. This variable has arguably no theoretical reason to influence earnings 
determination but may influence employment participation, especially that of women who must 
balance domestic responsibilities with the need to augment family income24. Therefore, it appears as a 
very good identifying variable for the selection equation since it is uncorrelated to the error term of the 
earnings equation. This is one way of overcoming the limitation of Heckman’s two-step procedure, 
that is, to find additional variables that arguably do affect labour market participation in the first step 
but have no direct impact on earnings in the second25. 
4.2. Gender wage decomposition techniques 
4.2.1 Oaxaca and Neumark's traditional decompositions 
The most common approach to identifying sources of gender wage gaps is the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition (e.g., Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). Two separate standard Mincerian log wage 
equations are estimated for males and females. The Oaxaca decomposition is: 
ffmfmmfm xxxww )()(lnln βββ −+−=−  (2) 
where mw  and fw  are the means of males and females' wages, respectively; mx  and fx  are vectors 
containing the respective means of the independent variables for males and females; and mβ  and fβ  
are the estimated coefficients. The first term on the right hand side captures the wage differential due 
to different characteristics of males and females. The second term is the wage gap attributable to 
different returns to those characteristics or coefficients.  
In equation (2), the male wage structure is taken as the non-discriminatory benchmark. It can be 
argued that, under discrimination, males are paid competitive wages but females are underpaid. If this 
is the case, the male coefficients should be taken as the non-discriminatory wage structure. 
Conversely, if employers pay females competitive wages but pay males more (nepotism), then the 
female coefficients should be used as the non-discriminatory wage structure. Therefore, the issue is 
how to determine the wage structure *β  that would prevail in the absence of discrimination. This 
choice poses the well-known index number problem given that we could use either the male or the 
female wage structure as the non-discriminatory benchmark. While a priori there is no preferable 
alternative, the decomposition can be quite sensitive to the selection made. If we let: 
fm I βββ )(* Ω−+Ω=  
                                                     
22 We also tested the proportion of children per household member but obtained less convincing results. 
23 The sum of the number of house, car, fridge, television, hi-fi, phone, radio and stove. 
24 Theoretically, getting married before having a first job may raise women's opportunity costs to labour market participation and, 
therefore, their reservation wage. If it is indeed the case, the expected impact of this variable on the probability of being employed at the 
time of the survey should be negative (with time, their incentives to participate may be less and less important as well as their 
employability). However, the presence of children soon after a marriage may exert a contradictory effect since children require care and 
supervision, but they also increase the needs for market goods, so for labour income (for further discussions, see Glick and Sahn, 1997).  
25 The data confirms this assumption. Note the heterogeneity of the 303 individuals who got married before their first job: 73% were 
women and, at the time of the interview, 21% were no longer married, 21% were unemployed, and 16% were both no longer married 
and unemployed.  
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where Ω is a weighting matrix and I is the identity matrix, then any assumption regarding *β  can be 
seen as an assumption regarding Ω. The literature has proposed different weighting schemes to deal 
with the underlying index problem: first, Oaxaca (1973) proposes either the current male wage 
structure, i.e. Ω=I (equation 2), or the current female wage structure, i.e., Ω=0 – the null matrix –, as 
*β , suggesting that the result would bracket the “true” non-discriminatory wage structure. Reimers 
(1983) implements a methodology that is equivalent to Ω=0.5 I. In other words, identical weights are 
assigned to both men and women. Cotton (1988) argues that the non-discriminatory structure should 
approach the structure that holds for the larger group. In the context of sex discrimination such 
weighting structure implies an Ω = ImI where Im is the fraction of males in the sample. 
Neumark (1988) proposes a general decomposition of the gender wage differential: 
])()[()(lnln *** ffmmfmfm xxxxww βββββ −+−+−=−  (3) 
This decomposition can be reduced to Oaxaca’s two special cases if it is assumed that there is no 
discrimination in the male wage structure, i.e. mββ =* , or if it is assumed that fββ =* . Neumark 
shows that β* can be estimated using the weighted average of the wage structures of males and 
females and advocates using the pooled sample to estimate *β . The first term is the gender wage gap 
attributable to differences in characteristics. The second and the third terms capture the difference 
between the actual and pooled returns for men and women, respectively. 
While Neumark's decomposition is attractive, it is not immune from common criticisms of 
decomposition methods in general, namely, the omission of variables that affect productivity. As a 
result, the gender wage gap may not be automatically attributed to discrimination or nepotism. Also, 
without evidence on the zero-homogeneity restriction on employer preferences (that is to say, 
employers care only about the proportion of each type of labour employed), it is not clear that the 
pooled coefficient is a good estimator of the non-discriminatory wage structure (Appleton et al., 
1999). In addition, like other conventional decomposition methods, Neumark's decomposition fails to 
account for differences in sectoral structures between gender groups. 
4.2.2 Appleton et al. (1999): sectoral decomposition 
The decomposition technique developed by Appleton et al. (1999) takes into account sectoral 
structures. They adopt a similar approach to that of Neumark (1988) and decompose the gender wage 
gap into three components. Since this technique is based on Neumark’s decomposition, it does not 
suffer from the index number problem encountered by previous authors who attempted to account for 
differences in occupational choices in their decomposition technique (Brown, Moon and Zoloth, 
1980). 
Let mW  and fW  be the means of the natural logs of male and female earnings and mjp  and fjp  be the 
sample proportions of men and women in sector j respectively. Similarly to Neumark (1988), 
Appleton et al. (1999) assume a sectoral structure that would prevail in the absence of gender 
differences in the impact of characteristics on sectoral choice ( *jp , the proportion of employees in 
sector j under this common structure). They then decompose the difference in proportions employed 
in, say, three sectors (public, formal private, self-employed or informal) such as: 
∑ ∑∑
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A multinominal logit model is used to specify the selection process of an individual into the different 
sectors. If qi is a vector of i’s relevant characteristics, the probability of an employee i being in sector j 
is given by: 
∑
=
=
3
1
)exp(/)exp(
j
iijiijij qqP γγ  with fmi ,=  
If the distribution of men and women across sectors is determined by the same set of coefficients *jγ , 
then the probability of an employee with characteristics qi being in sector j is:  
∑
=
=
3
1
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j
ijijij qqP γγ  
Hence, by estimating pooled and separate multinominal logit models for men and women, it is 
possible to derive the average probability for male and female employees in the different sectors. 
These mean probabilities are denoted by *ijp . The relationship between 
*γ  and iγ  are similar to that 
of *β  and jβ   in Neumark’s decomposition. Embedding the self-selection process in (4), the full 
decomposition can be written in the following way: 
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The first three terms are similar to Neumark decompositions of within-sector wage gaps. The fourth 
and fifth terms measure the difference in earnings due to differences in distribution of male and female 
employees in different sectors. The last two terms account for differences in earnings resulting from 
the deviations between predicted and actual sectoral compositions of men and women not accounted 
for by differences in characteristics. 
5. MADAGASCAR BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Over the past fifteen years or so, Madagascar, one of the poorest countries in the world, has embarked 
on a process of economic liberalisation, similarly to many African countries undergoing structural 
adjustment. Over the long term, Madagascar is distinguished by a constant decline in household living 
standards, which in 1996 reached the lowest point since independence. From the beginning of the 
1970s to 1996, per capita consumption was halved. From the mid-1990s, the reform process began to 
bear fruit. In 1997, growth in GDP per capita was slightly positive (+1%), for the first time in many 
years (Figure 1). This historic shift then accelerated, with growth reaching +4% in 2001. The contested 
Presidential elections in December 2001, followed by the open political crisis that continued 
throughout the first six months of 2002, jeopardized economic improvements, and living standards 
once again fell sharply (Roubaud, 2002). Since then, the country has been trying as best it can to 
recover. 
In 1998, the period referred to in this article, there had already been a very significant recovery in 
urban areas, especially in the capital, Antananarivo. In three years, from 1995 to 1998, the average real 
labour income grew by 35% and the median income by 51% (Table 2). The side-effects of growth had 
a very positive impact on the labour market: increase in schooling, decrease in child labour, slight 
decrease in unemployment, which is structurally low, but above all an end to the informal sector's 
domination of the labour market and a massive drop in underemployment and poverty. The incidence 
of extreme poverty (with the poverty line at US$ 1 in PPP) fell from 39% to 28%. In terms of gender, 
women's activity rate fell, corresponding to the withdrawal from the labour market of large numbers of 
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women who had been forced to work to provide additional income for their households during a 
severe crisis. At the same time, the income differential between men and women was reduced 
(Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 1999). 
Figure 1 : Evolution of GDP and private consumption per capita 1960-1998 
 
Source: INSTAT, authors’ calculation. 
Table 2 : Labour market dynamics 1995-1998 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998  1998/1995 
Average labour income (1,000 1995 Fmg) 103 101 125 139  +35.1% 
Median labour income (1,000 1995 Fmg) 65 74 83 98  +50.7% 
Earnings gap Men/Women (%) 99.2 85.3 77.5 70.1  -20.1 pts. 
Activity rate (%) 63.5 62.9 63.4 61.0  -2.5 pts. 
Activity rate of women (%) 58.5 58.3 57.5 56.7  -1.8 pts. 
Activity rate of children 10-14 yrs. old (%) 12.6 10.0 11.2 8.0  -4.6 pts 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.8 5.8 5.9  -0.4 pts. 
Global underemployment (%) 59.5 57.3 53.8 52.2  -7.3 pts. 
Incidence of Poverty (%) 39.1 35.6 28.2 28.4  -10.7 pts. 
Sources: Enquête 1-2-3, Phase 1, 1995-1998, MADIO; authors’ calculations. The global rate of underemployment includes the three forms 
of underemployment: unemployment, visible underemployment (total occupied workers working for less than 35 hours against 
their wishes) and invisible underemployment (total workers paid less than the minimum hourly wage). The poverty line 
corresponds to one 1985 dollar (PPP) per capita, per day. This line was held constant in real terms for the years from 1996 to 1998 
by adjusting for changes in the CPI. 
Despite improvements in the situation, the three years of recovery were not enough to erase several 
decades of continual deterioration in the labour market. In the long-term perspective that interests us 
here, the main characteristic of labour market evolution was the partial freeze on public sector 
recruitment from the mid-1980s, which went hand in hand with a fall in the numbers of wage-earners 
and an underlying rise in job precariousness. The decrease in jobs in the public sector was particularly 
significant for women (Antoine et al., 2000). After the age of 30, the percentage of working women 
present in the public sector was around 25% for the generation born between 1943 and 1952. It fell to 
around 10% for the intermediate generation (1953-1962) and only represented 5% for the youngest 
generation (Figures 2). 
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Figure 2 : Evolution of the job structure by cohort and gender 
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Source : Biomad98,  MADIO; Antoine et al. (2000). 
Although the massive decrease in access to public jobs is common to many countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, confronted since the early 1980s with a serious crisis in public finances and engaged in 
structural adjustment policies, the dynamism of the formal private sector since the beginning of the 
1990s is, on the contrary, far more specific to Madagascar. The younger generation has the largest 
proportion of wage-earners in the formal private sector at the age of 25-34. This observation applies to 
both men and women, but is more marked for women. The phenomenon can be explained to a great 
extent by the spectacular growth in export processing companies in the past few years, as 80% of their 
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employees are young women. Finally, the formal private sector hires a growing number of members of 
the younger generation, in fact nearly one out of two at present. 
Table 3 below describes the participation and the sectoral distribution of the population across gender 
in 1998. The participation rate is much lower for women, while unemployment is low and not 
significantly different by sex. Among occupied workers, women are concentrated in low quality jobs 
in the informal sector. Consequently their presence in the public sector is 8 points lower than for men. 
Table 3 : Participation and sectoral job allocation by gender 
 
% Males Females Total 
Inactive 5.11 22.08 13.89 
Unemployed 3.18 2.92 3.05 
Occupied 91.70 74.99 83.06 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Among occupied workers:    
Public wage employment 25.49 17.30 21.83 
Formal private wage employment 30.46 27.29 29.05 
Self-employment or informal sector 44.05 55.41 49.12 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Enquête 1-2-3, Phase 1,1998, MADIO; authors’ calculations. Restricted to individuals between 25 and 54 years old. 
Men and women bring different work experience to the labour market (Table 4). The Mincer proxy for 
potential work experience shows little difference in the work experience of men and women (22.6 and 
24.0 years), as the average age is the same, while the average years of education (successfully 
completed or not) are about one year lower for women. A different story emerges when actual labour 
market experience is applied. The average actual work experience is 20.5 years for men compared 
with 17.1 years for women. A similar ratio of male to female experience appears for the actual 
experience off the current job and, to a lesser degree, for tenure in the current job. However, 
differences in the average total unemployment periods between the sexes do not seem to fully explain 
these disparities since males have a higher average of unemployment episodes than females. 
Interestingly, women display the highest average of total inactivity spells, almost twice that of men. 
Nonetheless, the number of work interruptions is similar across genders. 
Table 4 : Differences in education and labour force attachment for paid work participants 
 
Variables (in years) Males (n=1 063)  Females (n=827) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.
      
Average age 40.28 8.17  40.24 8.26 
Average schooling successfully completed 8.87 4.38  7.89 4.35 
Average schooling (time spent in school) 11.69 5.87  10.23 5.73 
Potential work experience (age – schooling – 6)  22.60 10.24  24.01 10.72 
Actual labour market experience  20.58 9.70  17.18 10.51 
Actual labour market experience off the current job  11.52 9.20  9.62 9.18 
Tenure with the current employer  9.24 8.43  8.08 8.05 
Unemployment periods  1.14 2.18  0.82 1.90 
Inactivity periods 5.52 4.12  10.84 9.44 
Number of work interruptions 0.73 0.97  0.73 0.83 
Sources: Enquête 1-2-3, Phase 1, 1998, Biomad98, MADIO; authors’ calculations.  
Disaggregating by cohort gives a more precise view of the biases caused by only taking into account 
potential experience (Table 5). The bias is highest for women in the eldest generation. While the 
difference between potential and actual labour market experience is 4.2 years for the youngest 
generation of women, it increases to 11.8 for the eldest. For men, the gap is more or less constant 
across the cohorts (around 2 years). This result is explained by the accelerated demographic transition 
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process in the Madagascan capital. The number of descendants has fallen significantly in the past three 
decades. For example, at the age of 30, women belonging to the 1943-1952 generation had 
3.4 children; at the same age, the intermediate generation only had 2.7, whereas the youngest 
generation has 1.8. This fall in fertility rates comes from later first births (at 25, three-quarters of 
women in the eldest generation had had at least one child, against barely half in the youngest 
generation), and also from higher intergenesic intervals, for which the median period increased from 
37 months to 67 months from the eldest to the youngest generation (Antoine et al., 2000). 
Table 5 : Differences in earnings and human capital across gender and generation 
 
Variables  Males Females Difference 
 Mean Mean   
Hourly earnings* 2.20  1.52  0.68 
 
Generation 1963-1972  
    
Hourly earnings 1.42  0.94  0.47 
Years of schooling successfully completed 9.60  9.04  0.57 
Years of potential experience 10.75  11.71  -0.96 
Years of actual experience  9.22  7.53  1.69 
Generation 1953-1962      
Hourly earnings 2.32  1.55  0.77 
Years of schooling successfully completed 9.28  7.75  1.53 
Years of potential experience 20.98  23.30  -2.32 
Years of actual experience  18.87  14.94  3.93 
Generation 1943-1952      
Hourly earnings 2.59  1.63  0.95 
Years of schooling successfully completed 8.38  7.12  1.26 
Years of potential experience 31.76  33.39  -1.63 
Years of actual experience  29.13  21.64  7.49 
Sources: Enquête 1-2-3, Phase 1, 1998, Biomad98, MADIO; authors’ calculations.  
* : in Madagascan Francs (Fmg).  
Figure 3 : Log hourly earnings of men (1) and women (2) by percentile 
 
Figure 3 shows the log hourly earnings of men and women at each percentile of the earnings 
distribution. For example, the value on the vertical axis at the 50th percentile represents the median log 
earnings of men and women. The difference between the two curves (the surface in-between) indicates 
that the gender earnings gap is smaller in the upper tail of the earnings distribution and narrows 
throughout the distribution: low-earnings workers experience higher gender earnings inequalities than 
Q
ua
nt
ile
s 
of
 lo
g_
ho
ur
ly_
ea
rn
in
gs
Fraction of the data
 1  2
0 .25 .5 .75 1
-2.78037
4.57357
 20 
high-earnings workers. This is at odds with some studies on developed countries that show the 
existence of a “glass ceiling” phenomenon26. 
6. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
6.1. Potential versus actual experience: refining labour market attachment measures in 
earnings functions 
Regressions introducing actual experience instead of potential experience shed light on gender-
differentiated effects. From models (2) and (3), when total actual experience is accounted for, the 
return to experience diminishes for women while it increases for men, and becomes more significant. 
This is at odds with former expectations. In columns (4) and (5), the same specifications are corrected 
for potential selectivity bias, employing the method described in section 4.127. In both models, the 
coefficient on the correction term (IMR) is negative and insignificant at the usual confidence interval 
(10% level). However, it seems to have more impact in models (4), for both men and women, that is, 
when actual experience is not accounted for. These results indicate that, at least when potential 
experience is used, the probability of having positive earnings is negatively correlated with the error 
terms of the earnings functions for both men and women. In other words, unobserved characteristics 
that increase the probability of participating in paid work may have a negative effect on earnings. 
Nonetheless, this mechanism of allocation in the two groups (paid work participants versus non-
participants) does not affect earnings significantly.  
In models (4), note that the magnitude of the coefficient on the lambda term is the same for men and 
women (-0.19). Interestingly, once the actual measure of experience is introduced instead of the 
potential one, the female correction term increases to 0.06 while it is only marginally modified for 
males and remains negative (column 5, Tables A1 and A2). In fact, the return to actual experience 
remains insignificantly modified for males after correction for potential selectivity. However, this is 
not the case for females for whom the actual experience variable appears somewhat underestimated 
without correction (columns 3 and 5, Table A2). This provides evidence that it is important to control 
for sample selection effects when assessing the returns to human capital, especially for women. 
Finally, note that the estimated marginal returns to experience are quite small and remain significantly 
higher for females than for males whatever the estimated model (in column 5, 1.5% against 0.8%). 
The latter result is a common one, especially in developing countries, given that women generally 
have less labour market experience than men and are therefore better rewarded for this.  
Columns (6) expand the regressors of column (5) to include two labour force attachment variables 
(LFAVs) reflecting non-working time (total years of unemployment and inactivity). Adding non-
working time allows for the possibility that human capital appreciates and depreciates at different 
rates. Inactivity is statistically significant in the female regression (at the 5% level), but insignificant in 
the male one. However, actual experience remains statistically significant at 1% for both sexes. 
Interestingly, it is men who are more likely to be penalised for unemployment, though the estimated 
coefficient on the unemployment variable is insignificant at 10%. Moreover, quite curiously, females 
show a positive premium for their periods of inactivity. This is at odds with former intuition but may 
be explained by socio-economic stylised facts of the Madagascan labour market and/or data 
deficiencies. Given the confidence we place in the quality of our data, our tentative explanation is that 
women’s inactivity spells are not penalised by employers because the latter may give more value to 
women’s home activity than to unemployment periods strictly speaking. In fact, unemployment is less 
likely to be related to parenting than inactivity and may voice a negative signal in employers’ eyes. In 
contrast, during women’s complete withdrawals from the labour market, there might be a human 
capital accumulation effect as a result of, for instance, childcare that provides them with parenting 
skills and more responsibilities in the household. As a result, women returning to work after an 
absence from the labour market may not necessarily suffer skill losses, nor missed promotion 
                                                     
26 The existence of a glass ceiling implies that women's wages fall further behind men's at the top of the wage distribution than at the 
middle or the bottom. See Fortin and Lemieux (1998); Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman (2003) and Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan 
(2004). 
27 The first-stage probit estimates of males and females' employment participation appear in Appendix, Table A0. 
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opportunities, compared to their male counterparts who are more likely to work in highly skilled fields 
where both career advancement and skill depreciation are relatively fast. On the contrary, women may 
benefit from enhanced credibility. In fact, women’s unobserved individual heterogeneities may be 
positively correlated to their inactivity but also to their earnings.  
Introducing inactivity and unemployment periods in earnings functions raises the estimated return to 
actual experience by 15% for females (from 1.50% to 1.72%) but slightly diminishes that of males 
(columns 6). We now find that the female return to actual experience is higher than that of potential 
experience (1.72% versus 1.51%), as previously expected, as was already the case for males. 
Therefore, given the high amount of time spent out of the labour force for women (on average, 
10 years versus 5 years for men), being able to differentiate in earnings functions between the various 
episodes spent in and out of the labour market seems to be an important step towards refining the 
returns to human capital variables across the sexes. This may also affect the portion of the gender 
earnings gap component that is not explained by gender differences in observed characteristics. 
We are also interested in the coefficient on the schooling variable. This coefficient, commonly 
interpreted as the private return to education, seems to be underestimated for females when actual 
experience is used without controls for limited LFAVs, but remains relatively constant for males 
(columns 5 and 6). With regard to measurement error, there is in general no reason to suppose that the 
differential effect of work experience affects estimates of male and female schooling differently. 
Nonetheless, in the case of work experience, as we showed in sections 2 and 5, the female measure is 
likely to be subject to relatively large conceptual measurement error. Accordingly, the female 
experience coefficient may be subject to a relatively large downwards bias. If there is a negative 
correlation between schooling and work experience (as it is the case in our data), a relatively large 
downwards bias in the female experience coefficient (as evidenced by our estimates when selectivity 
and LFAVs are not accounted for, column 3) could in turn give rise to a relatively large downwards 
bias in the female schooling coefficient (Dougherty, 2003)28. Columns 2 to 6 of Table A2 highlight 
that the marginal return to experience was somewhat underestimated for females. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficients on education are affected by the inclusion of LFAVs, especially for women. 
Indeed, the return to education increases from 11.10% to 11.96% per year for women, and falls 
slightly from 8.84% to 8.54% for men. As a consequence, by introducing both actual experience and 
LFAVs we are able to estimate the “true” return to schooling that may frequently be biased when 
proxy measures of labour market experience are used in Mincer-type earnings regressions. In 
particular, the female coefficient on education is likely to be biased downwards when only actual 
experience is included without controls for other LFAVs. We will use these regressors in the rest of 
the paper as they have a real impact on the precision of our estimates. 
From columns (7) to (10), our purpose is to continue refining the measure of experience by 
decomposing it into different quantitative and qualitative work spells using individuals’ employment 
records. Columns (7) and (8) take into account the years of tenure with the current employment and its 
squared value in two types of specification, that is, with potential experience (columns 7) and with 
actual experience and the two LFAVs (columns 8). In fact, as tenure is an important productivity 
component and females often have less tenure, neglecting it in a wage regression could lead to a 
serious over-estimation of the discrimination component, as evidenced by Weichselbaumer and 
Winter-Ebmer (2003). Our estimates show that tenure and its square are not statistically significant in 
either model for men, while they are highly significant for women in both specifications. In the case of 
men, standard human capital theory would interpret model (8) by arguing that general human capital 
                                                     
28 In the model uXXY +++= 22110 βββ , where X1 is subject to measurement error with expected value 0 and variance 2 1Xσ , it can 
be shown that the limiting value of the OLS estimator of 2β  is: 
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significantly increases wages (the return to total actual experience is statistically significant and 
positive) unlike specific human capital (the return to tenure is insignificant). However, note that since 
tenure and total actual experience are positively correlated (about 0.45), the latter captures a fair 
amount of the effect of the former when both variables are introduced as regressors. 
Columns (9) propose a further alternative measure of experience replacing the commonly used tenure 
with the current employer. Firstly, we took into account the fact that workers may have had two 
different and successive occupations with the same employer. For instance, individuals who have 
worked for the same employer for their entire life may have started as blue-collar workers and, after 
some time, become white-collar workers. In this context, it might be a strong hypothesis to assume a 
unique marginal return to tenure for both occupations, even if they took place in the same firm29 : there 
is indeed empirical evidence that the returns to tenure may not be entirely sector or firm-specific but 
also linked to the human capital diffusion process which is, in turn, closely related to workers’ 
occupational features and choices (Destré and Nordman, 2002; Nordman and Hayward, 2004). To 
address this issue, we tested a variable taking into account the length of the last occupation taken up 
with the last employer instead of the overall years of tenure with the same employer. The rewards for 
an additional year of experience in the same occupation amount to 1.19% for males and 3.4% for 
females, while they are respectively 0.07% and 2.06% for the overall tenure30. Hence, it appears that 
the returns to experience within the last occupation are much higher than those of the overall tenure. 
The latter may therefore reflect a “sticky floor” effect31. 
Secondly, it is debatable whether experience accumulated in the current employment should always be 
distinguished from that accumulated in previous jobs. Workers may have practiced exactly the same 
profession, or carried out the same specific duties, in other contexts, firms or workshops32. Therefore, 
it could be that with earnings, especially across gender, it is just the time spent in accumulating the 
technical know-how that is part of each worker’s profession that is important and not necessarily 
where that knowledge was gained33. To test this second assumption, we introduced a variable taking 
into account the time accumulated while working in the same profession in columns (9), e.g. 
practicing the same duty, irrespective of the workplace, firm or employer. Unlike the males’ return to 
tenure in model (8), the marginal return to experience in the main profession is significant for males, 
though very low when computing it with the quadratic term at the sample mean (0.6%). For females, 
this return is lower than that of tenure in model (8) (respectively, 1.48% versus 2.06%). Therefore, the 
gap between the returns to experience across gender is slightly reduced when experience in the main 
profession is controlled for. This may indicate that men benefit from their more assiduous 
participation in employment than women who may suffer more human capital depreciation, or find it 
difficult to acquire skills related to the same given profession, as a result of their less regular labour 
force attachment.  
Finally, models (10) replace the total actual experience measure by a variable net of the time spent in 
the current job (thereby, the actual experience off the current main employment) in order to avoid 
accounting for the same spell of experience twice. The overall actual experience is then segmented and 
well accounted for. We also introduced additional qualitative LFAVs (‘augmented LFAVs’), such as 
the total number of work interruptions, its squared value – to take into account its possible non-linear 
marginal effect –, and a dummy indicating workers’ high proportion of ‘relevant’ experience, i.e. 
                                                     
29 Regarding the gender issue, remember that males have on average more tenure than females (9.2 versus 8.1 years) but both display the 
same average amount of time spent in the last occupation (about 7.5 years). 
30 We take into account the decreasing marginal return to experience over time and thus use the quadratic terms of the equations. The 
estimates also introduce the actual experience preceding the type of experience that we want to consider (either the time spent within the 
current occupation or the overall tenure in the current job). They are not presented here due to lack of space. 
31 At the bottom of the wage distribution in industrialised countries, some authors found that the gender pay gap widens significantly and 
defined this phenomenon as a sticky floor (see Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2003; Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2004). Our graph 
in Figure 3 may suggest the existence of this phenomenon in Madagascar, instead of a “glass ceiling” effect. Indeed, low returns to the 
total tenure might reflect the fact that a long period of time is needed for the individuals at the bottom of the pay scale to be promoted 
and to benefit from increased wages. 
32 See note 12. 
33 This echoes the question of how to differentiate between the various sources of human capital accumulation in wage equations, which 
may be different from knowing whether it is general or specific (Becker, 1975). In fact, the nature of human capital may not be 
exclusively linked to the fact of belonging to a given employer or firm (i.e. to who pays the worker) but also to what he/she has actually 
learnt – and how – while performing the same specific task. 
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whether the proportion of preceding actual experience accumulated in the same sector as the current 
one is equal to or higher than 50%34. We also added an interaction term between the number of work 
interruptions and the schooling variable to allow for possible differentiated effects of labour market 
withdrawals across educational levels35. 
Both experience variables (actual experience off the incumbent job and tenure) are then statistically 
significant (except the squared value of tenure for males) which reinforces the idea that the models are 
better specified when total actual experience is properly segmented as compared to models 8. Note 
that the dummy for a high proportion of previous actual experience in the same sector (relevant 
experience) is insignificant for both males and females. This might be an important result since some 
studies emphasize the importance of relevant experience in wage determination as it is often assumed 
to be a good measure of job-related human capital (Barron, Berger and Black, 1999).  
Other studies have suggested the potential negative impact of work interruptions on earnings 
differentials (see section 2.1), without, however, suggesting compelling estimates mostly due to a lack 
of relevant data. Our estimates suggest that work interruptions have no clear impact on males’ 
earnings (except the quadratic term). Interestingly, on the contrary, these interruptions do affect 
females’ earnings significantly. For women, all the three estimated coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level: negative effect of the number of interruptions, positive impact of 
its squared value and its interaction with education. Hence, the marginal negative effect of a female’s 
work interruption on her earnings is reduced by: (1) the quantity of these interruptions and (2) her 
level of education. In other words, highly educated women are less penalised than their poorly 
educated counterparts. Also, the higher the number of interruptions, the lower the marginal negative 
effect in absolute value. 
Finally, it seems important to consider sectoral participation in order to understand the returns to 
observed characteristics and, in particular, to human capital variables. The estimates of the sectoral 
dummies’ coefficients are large and often statistically significant (the reference being the public sector 
that always appears to be the most rewarding for women). This is in accordance with the usual 
persistence in empirical studies of uncompensated earnings differentials across individuals with 
identical productive characteristics36. The results show that workers with comparable measured 
characteristics can have very different earnings because they belong to different institutional sectors. 
So far, we have disregarded the possible endogeneity of these sectoral participation choices in 
earnings determination for the sake of simplicity. We now turn to our sectoral approach. 
6.2. Sectoral earnings functions 
Estimates from earnings equations for men and women in public wage employment, private wage 
employment and self-employment or informal sector (hereafter simply “informal”) are presented in 
Tables A4 and A5. The earnings equations are corrected for potential selectivity bias, employing the 
method described above, and using the sectoral choice model estimates to calculate the selectivity 
factors37. For women, only the correction term in the informal sector is positive and statistically 
significant. This means that unobserved characteristics that increase the probability of working in this 
sector also have a positive effect on earnings. However, male estimates show that there is sample 
selectivity for each considered sector: the correction term is significant and negative in both the public 
and private wage sectors while it is significant and positive in the informal sector. Hence, informal 
sector participation is associated with unobserved characteristics that are positively correlated to 
earnings differentials, both for men and women. 
                                                     
34 This is the ratio of the time spent off the current job working in the same institutional sector as the current one (public, private formal or 
self-employed/informal) to the total actual experience. The dummy is equal to 1 for 29% of the sample (respectively, 24% and 36% of 
the sub-samples of males and females). 
35 The thinking behind this is that the higher the education, the higher the penalty for work interruptions. To our knowledge, however, there 
is no clear theoretical argument to support this intuitive idea. 
36 See Krueger and Summers (1988), Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Goux and Maurin (1999). 
37 The maximum likelihood estimates of the multinomial logit sectoral choice models are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
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As expected, the models' explanatory power goes in descending order from public employment, to 
private employment, then to informal employment, with R2 varying, depending on the specifications 
considered, by [0.58, 0.73], [0.38, 0.40] and [0.29, 0.31] respectively for each of the three sectors. This 
hierarchy is consistent with the predictions of the standard human capital model, as this is better suited 
to accounting for the heterogeneity of earnings in the public sector where wages are based on a set 
scale that takes these criteria (education, tenure) explicitly into account. On the other hand, in the 
informal sector, apart from the probability of greater measurement errors, other factors not taken into 
account in our equation, such as the amount of capital, are likely to have a significant impact on 
earnings. Tests for the joint equality of coefficients (Chow test, likelihood ratios) show that both the 
decomposition by institutional sector and the separate estimates of equations by gender are justified. 
It is in the formal private sector that experience has the most value. Depending on the models, the 
coefficients of experience vary from 0.0101 to 0.0157 in the public sector and from 0.0229 to 0.0268 
in the formal private sector. In the informal sector, on the contrary, actual or potential experience has 
no significant impact on men’s earnings differentials while the returns to women’s actual experience 
amount to 1.3%. 
For men and women alike, taking into account the actual number of years worked always leads to an 
increase in the return to experience, except in the informal sector for men where returns to experience 
are insignificant. The effect is particularly important for women. For example, in the public sector, one 
year of actual additional experience leads to an increase in earnings of 1.57%, compared with 1.0% for 
potential experience. 
Education is always a profitable investment and returns are much higher than for experience. Once 
again, the informal sector is an exception to the rule for men, whose earnings do not depend on their 
level of schooling. Although non-negligible and weakly significant (at 10% level), the return to 
education for women is very much lower when actual experience is accounted for, at around 6%, than 
that recorded for the other sectors. On average, women's education is given more value than that of 
their male counterparts. This difference reaches 6 percentage points in the informal sector, more than 
2 points in the formal private sector and 2 points in the public sector (even 3 points when actual 
experience and LFAVs are included instead of potential experience). The latter result is all the more 
surprising that in this sector wages are supposed to follow the same scale for everyone, irrespective of 
gender. The gap in returns to education may, in part, reflect the impact of occupational segregation or 
of unobservable factors playing in women's favour. We will take a closer look at this hypothesis in the 
next section. 
Finally, spells of inactivity or unemployment do not seem to penalise workers, except the years of 
unemployment for males in the public sector and, to a lesser extent, in the informal sector. Whereas, in 
line with our initial hypothesis, the coefficients are generally negative for males, i.e. the length of 
unemployment or withdrawal from the labour market tends to depreciate the human capital of 
occupied wage-earners, they are often insignificant. On the contrary, and in line with our tentative 
explanation when commenting the global cross-sector models, women seem to benefit from spells of 
inactivity in the formal private sector. Having a long-term contract or having received on-the-job 
training are factors that improve men's earnings, especially in the public sector. Finally, unions have a 
positive impact on wages, but only in the public sector, the only sector where they have sufficient 
weight to have effective bargaining power. 
6.3. Earnings decompositions 
Table A6 provides an overview of the gender earnings decompositions using the alternative 
decomposition techniques described in section 4.2. We present the main rough results drawn from the 
decompositions (that is, the proportion of the explained versus unexplained gender earnings gap)38 
using different non-selectivity corrected earnings models. They include alternatively our different 
measures of experience, the limited and augmented LFAVs together with two sets of limited and 
augmented control variables (see definitions at the bottom of Table A6). 
                                                     
38 Hereafter, we will simply refer to it as the « gender gap ». 
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The overall results confirm that a greater portion of the gender gap can be explained using actual 
rather than potential experience. Depending on the decomposition techniques used, the explained 
component ranges from about 11.4% to 22.5% in the conventional model (using potential experience 
and the limited control variables) and from 24% to 38.7% using actual experience instead of potential. 
This variation is quite considerable. Moreover, using the different augmented models discussed in 
section 6.1 (adding non-working time – the limited and augmented LFAVs – and using successively 
total actual experience, previous experience off the current job, tenure in the current employment, and 
experience in the main profession) progressively reduces the share of the unexplained component from 
88% to 70.2% in Oaxaca’s decomposition. These findings are novel for Madagascar, and more 
generally for Africa, but similar to findings in developed countries39. Hence, the share of the gap 
attributable to differences in experience between men and women appears to be severely 
underestimated when potential instead of actual experience variables are used. Looking again at 
Oaxaca’s decomposition, differences in actual experience account for about 9.4% of the gap, while 
potential work experience explains only 3.3%. 
This may be explained as follows: first, as stated earlier, men and women differ little in the mean 
characteristics of potential experience but they differ significantly in actual experience. Second, 
although potential and actual experience are highly correlated (78%), an additional year of actual 
experience gives different returns than a year of potential experience. So, when the actual measure is 
used, both the difference in means and the difference in returns produce a greater explained 
component than when the potential variable is introduced.  
Adding time spent out of the labour market (inactivity) and unemployment spells generally increases 
the percentage of the earnings gap explained by labour market attachment differences (actual 
experience, inactivity and unemployment). Overall, educational differences continue to explain more 
of the gender gap than labour force attachment differences (in Oaxaca’s decomposition, 22% versus 
14%). Interestingly, once actual experience and LFAVs are controlled for, the fraction of the gender 
gap explained by education remains quite stable. This is at odds with some findings in industrialised 
countries where, in the absence of actual experience and non-working time spells, Antecol and Bedard 
(2004) have shown that educational differences appear to absorb some of the systematic differences in 
labour force attachment40. This would suggest that, in the absence of actual experience measures, 
education is not able to absorb the variations in actual experience since the latter are not necessarily 
correlated with educational attainment. 
Overall, the addition of the various actual experience and non-working time measures increases the 
proportion of the gender gap explained by observable characteristics to nearly 30% using Oaxaca’s 
decomposition and up to 45% with Neumark’s, while using only potential experience allows us to 
explain no more than 11% and 22% respectively. Hence, Neumark’s decomposition clearly always 
produces the highest share of the explained component. 
In the last panel of Table A6, we use the set of augmented control variables including job 
characteristics such as the type of work contract, the presence of a union, 7 occupational dummies and 
9 industry dummies describing the type of activity in the sectors of employment. We present these 
estimates separately because, in the labour economics literature, there is no consensus as to whether 
job characteristics should be taken into account in assessing the extent of the gender earnings gap (see 
section 4.1). Unsurprisingly, controlling for these job characteristics greatly reduces the unexplained 
component of the gender gap. In this context, the unexplained gender gap falls to 61% with Oaxaca’s 
decomposition and to 29% with Neumark’s. We would argue that the effect of controlling for job 
characteristics on the gender earnings gap reflects the occupational segregation that may be present in 
Madagascar.  
Although the selectivity corrections are not generally significant in the pooled models of Tables A1 
and A2, they are sometimes quantitatively large; they also modify the OLS estimates and, hence, may 
                                                     
39 For example, Wright and Ermisch (1991), O'Neill and Polachek (1993), Myck and Paull (2004) for the United Kingdom and the United 
States, and Meurs and Ponthieux (2000) for France. 
40 These patterns are drawn from wage gaps across ethnic minorities and race. 
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affect the decompositions. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) show that sample selection complicates the 
interpretation of wage decompositions. They offer several alternative decompositions, each based on 
different assumptions and objectives. We use one that consists in considering selectivity as a separate 
component. This technique has the advantage of not calling for any prior hypothesis regarding the 
links between individual characteristics and selectivity. An additional term in the decomposition 
measures the contribution of selection effects to the observed gender earnings gap: ffmm λθλθ ˆˆˆˆ −  
where λˆ  and θˆ  denote respectively the mean Inverse Mills Ratio and its estimated coefficient from 
each regression by sex41. 
Table A7 presents the Oaxaca and Neumark’s decompositions controlling for selectivity effects and 
using two types of earnings model with the limited control variables: potential experience and 
segmented actual experience plus augmented LFAVs. By means of potential experience, the share of 
the gap explained by individual characteristics goes from 9% in Oaxaca’s decomposition to 18% in 
Neumark’s, while the unexplained portion of the gap (that due to discrimination) amounts respectively 
to 65% and 56%. In both decompositions, the selectivity component represents 25% of the gender gap. 
Hence, as compared to our results of Table A6, panel 6, it appears that the selectivity correction has 
mostly reduced the share of the gap attributed to individual characteristics (respectively, 29% and 45% 
in Table A6 versus 9% and 18%) instead of diminishing that due to discrimination (respectively, 70% 
and 54% in Table A6 versus 65% and 56%). Replacing potential experience by actual experience and 
augmented LFAVs also provides meaningful results: in both decompositions, the portion of the gap 
explained by individual endowments significantly increases (respectively, to 28% and 33%) to the 
detriment of the share explained by selectivity effects, which falls to 10%. The discrimination 
component also diminishes to 62% in Oaxaca’s decomposition. 
The Neumark decomposition can be used to determine whether the differences in returns reflect higher 
return for men compared to a pooled (assumed non-discriminatory) structure or lower returns to 
women. The deviation in female returns from the pooled earnings regression is about ten times more 
important than the deviation in male returns. Therefore, it can be concluded that discrimination against 
women is more relevant than nepotism towards men (in Neumark’s terminology) in explaining the 
gender gap. 
Of course, these decompositions may suffer from biases due to the sample pooling of individuals 
working in the three institutional sectors. As we have shown in the previous section, the returns to 
individual characteristics and especially to human capital variables differ across sectors. Moreover, 
mean earnings differ greatly across sectors and sexes. This explains why we now turn to sectoral 
decompositions in Table A8. There are indeed significant variations in the decompositions across the 
three sectors. Firstly, let us note that, in the public sector, mean earnings are higher for women than for 
men. In this sector, the gender gap is therefore in favour of females42. In fact, women employees have 
more favourable characteristics than their male counterparts. On the contrary, the gender earnings gap 
is in favour of males in the private sector and, more importantly, in the informal sectors. In these 
sectors, respectively 20% and 4% of the gender gap is explained by differences in observed 
endowments (in favour of males) while workers’ characteristics explain much more of the gender gap 
in the public sector (46%).  
Secondly, the same picture as above emerges from Neumark's decomposition for the public and 
private sectors: from the male and female deviations in returns, discrimination against women is more 
pronounced than nepotism towards men, especially in the public sector. Given the higher mean 
earnings for women in this sector, females offset this discrimination in returns by their more 
favourable observed characteristics. In the informal sector, the deviation in returns from the pooled 
wage structure is detrimental to men.  
                                                     
41 If the pooled wage structure is used (Neumark, 1988), the selectivity term can be expanded to 
ffmmfm λθθλθθλλθ ˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ −+−+− , where θˆ  is the estimated Inverse Mills Ratio coefficient from the pooled male-female 
sample. 
42 Similarly, Glewwe (1990) found no wage discrimination against women in the public sector in Ghana. 
 27 
However, selectivity effects account for much of the gaps in the public and informal sectors while 
discrimination is more acute in the private sector. In the informal sector, for instance, selectivity 
explains almost 90% of the gender gap while the share attributable to discrimination amounts to 7%.  
The full decomposition developed by Appleton et al. (1999), taking into account the location of men 
and women in the three sectors, is finally presented in Table A9. We control for selectivity effects 
using earnings offered to men and women (instead of actual earnings) which are net of the impact of 
the selectivity corrections, that is, )ˆˆ( mjmjmjW λθ−  and )ˆˆ( fjfjfjW λθ− for the j sectors (see Reimer, 
1983; Appleton et al., 1999). The first three terms address the differences in returns due to within-
sector differences and are weighted sums of the Neumark decomposition of the within-sector earnings 
gaps. In line with the traditional decomposition results of Tables A7 and A8, the deviations in returns 
(the discrimination component) explain much of the within-sector differences. The same picture 
emerges from Appleton et al.’s full decomposition on Côte d’Ivoire, which also show negative signs 
on the deviation components, that is to say, favourable deviation of females’ returns as compared to 
the pooled earnings structure. 
The last three terms of the full decomposition tell us the share of the gender gap which may be 
attributed to gender differences in proportions of workers in each sector. The positive sum of these 
three terms implies that the differences in sectoral locations are more favourable to men than to 
women. The gender earnings gap would have been more than three times smaller if men and women 
had been equally distributed across the three sectors. This might be because fewer women than men 
are located in the higher paying public sector where the gender earnings gap is in favour of women. 
Female paid work participants are found less in the public sector than their male counterparts 
(respectively, 35% against 64%) while they are almost equally distributed in the lower paying 
informal sector (49% versus 51%). Hence, the weak representation of women in the higher paying 
public sector appears to contribute towards keeping the gender pay gap greater than it otherwise would 
be. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Our study of Madagascar represents the first attempt to shed light on the determination of the gender 
earnings gap while using detailed information from biographical and labour force surveys. This unique 
matched data set enables us to reassess the returns to human capital across gender, notably by 
introducing various measures of individuals’ labour force attachment. We then propose different 
decompositions of the gender earnings gap that take into account (1) the effects of selection relating to 
labour force and sectoral participations (public, formal private and informal/self-employed sectors) 
and (2) alternatives to the standard methods for measuring human capital, especially workers' 
professional experience.  
Our results show that, although the experience coefficients from earnings regressions based on 
potential and actual experience are almost similar when these variables are introduced alone, adding 
more detailed labour force attachment variables (unemployment, inactivity spells or the number of 
work interruptions) leads us to greatly reassess these estimates. Using these regressors in earnings 
functions increases the return to actual experience for both males and females. This return always 
exceeds that of potential experience. In addition, we found a negative effect of the number of work 
interruptions on females’ earnings. This marginal negative effect decreases with the quantity of 
interruptions. Also, with regard to labour force withdrawals, highly educated women seem less 
penalised than their poorly educated counterparts. 
The estimates segmented by sector also highlight that, for men and women alike, taking into account 
the actual number of years worked always leads to an increase in the return to experience. The effect is 
particularly important for women. For example, in the public sector, one year of actual additional 
experience leads to an increase in earnings of 1.57%, compared with 1.0% for potential experience. 
Spells of inactivity or unemployment do not seem to penalise workers, except the years of 
unemployment for males in the public sector and, to a lesser extent, in the informal sector. 
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Our various earnings decompositions show that differences in average actual experience across sexes 
lead to markedly different estimates of the fraction of the gender earnings gap that is explained by 
experience. In non-selectivity corrected earnings decompositions, the addition of the different actual 
experience and non-working time measures increases the proportion of the gender gap explained by 
observable characteristics to nearly 30% using Oaxaca’s decomposition and up to 45% with 
Neumark’s decomposition, while using only potential experience allows us to explain no more than 
11% and 22% respectively. We also provide evidence that, in the absence of labour force attachment 
measures, education is not able to absorb the variations in actual experience since the latter are not 
necessarily correlated with educational attainment. This is an additional argument to support the need 
for more precise labour force participation measures in developing countries. Once sample selectivity 
effects are controlled for, replacing potential experience by actual experience and labour force 
attachment variables still provides meaningful results: in both Oaxaca and Neumark's decompositions, 
the portion of the gap explained by individual endowments increases significantly (respectively, to 
27% and 32%) to the detriment of the share explained by selectivity effects, which falls to 10%. 
The gender earnings decomposition also differs across sectors. The gender gap is in favour of males in 
the formal private and informal sectors while, in the public sector, women seem better off than men. 
Respectively, 20% and 4% of the gender gap is explained by differences in observed endowments in 
the two private sectors while workers’ characteristics explain much more of the gender gap (in favour 
of females) in the state sector (46%). However, selectivity effects account for much of the gaps in the 
public and informal sectors while discrimination is more acute in the formal private sector. 
In addition to the conventional decomposition methods, our estimates utilise Appleton, Hoddinott and 
Krishnan (1999)'s decomposition technique which incorporates the impact of sectoral location to 
examine the gender earnings disparities within each sector. Traditional decomposition methods fail 
indeed to account for differences in sectoral structures between gender groups. The method of 
Appleton et al. (1999) overcomes this problem and reveals that the differences in sectoral locations are 
more favourable to men than to women. The gender earnings gap would have been more than three 
times smaller if men and women had been equally distributed across the three sectors. Hence, the 
weak representation of women in the higher paying public sector appears to contribute towards 
keeping the gender pay gap greater than it otherwise would be. Therefore, public sector downsizing 
(the partial freeze on public sector recruitment from the mid-1980s in Madagascar) worsens women’s 
economic position as more women move away from the state sector to the private sector. The separate 
decompositions by sector, such as Oaxaca and Neumark’s, ignore sectoral composition differences, 
masking the extent of the impact of the state sector downsizing on women.  
The regression models used in the decomposition analysis account for no more than half of the 
variation in the earnings of men and women. The model might be better fitted to the data by including 
other variables deemed to influence earnings. Typically, the data used comes from household surveys. 
For a long time, researchers have been unable to document the potential effect of job and firm 
characteristics – other than industry and firm size – on the wages of men and women. New linked 
employer–employee surveys would therefore allow researchers to move beyond the individual worker 
to consider the importance of the workplace in wage determination. People differ in their preferences 
for particular types of work (that is, paid work or self-employment, hours, location, working 
conditions, responsibilities). Differences between men and women in the labour market may reflect 
genuine differences in preferences, pre-labour market experiences, expectations, or opportunities. 
Much of the literature has emphasised the importance of imperfect information about worker 
attributes. However, there is also much to learn about the demand-side factors that may influence 
employers when they make decisions concerning hiring and promotions or use gender to predict future 
work commitment. There is clearly still room for prolific studies in this direction. 
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Table A0 : Probit Estimates of Males and Females' Employment Participation 
 
Overall 
sample Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Individual characteristics    
    
Sex -0.1654 _ _ 
 (1.54)   
Age 0.1122*** 0.2710*** 0.0666 
 (2.60) (3.75) (1.24) 
(Age)2 -0.0018*** -0.0042*** -0.0011* 
 (3.27) (4.54) (1.69) 
Catholic 0.1071 0.3671** 0.0167 
 (1.29) (2.29) (0.16) 
Other religion -0.1370 0.3259 -0.4071 
 (0.58) (0.75) (1.33) 
Merina 0.2703** 0.3853** 0.1522 
 (2.42) (2.28) (1.04) 
Household head 0.7554*** 0.7209*** 0.6710*** 
 (5.24) (3.14) (3.26) 
Head’s spouse -0.2361 _ 0.0885 
 (1.54)  (0.48) 
Head’s children 0.1401 -0.1239 0.3661* 
 (0.98) (0.56) (1.86) 
Head’s parent -0.6507 _ -0.8547 
 (0.82)  (0.95) 
Married 0.4328*** 0.9957*** -0.0565 
 (3.19) (4.10) (0.33) 
Married before first employment 0.4514*** 0.2099 0.4581*** 
 (4.00) (0.70) (3.93) 
Years of completed schooling 0.0342*** 0.0299 0.0449*** 
 (2.93) (1.14) (3.14) 
Total actual labour market experience 0.0511*** 0.0703*** 0.0492*** 
 (10.71) (4.14) (9.73) 
    
Household’s characteristics    
    
Household’s income per capita  -0.0006** -0.0011** -0.0005 
 (2.18) (2.48) (1.50) 
Proxy of material wealth 0.0428** 0.1414*** 0.0139 
 (2.19) (3.86) (0.69) 
Inverse dependency ratio 0.1928 0.6195 -0.0798 
 (0.87) (1.50) (0.29) 
Number of children between 0 and 4 years old  0.0604 0.3495*** -0.1086 
 (0.98) (3.08) (1.39) 
Number of children between 5 and 9 years old  0.1169** 0.1042 0.0603 
 (1.99) (0.98) (0.85) 
Number of children between 10 and 14 years old  0.1651*** 0.2205** 0.0980 
 (2.70) (2.17) (1.31) 
Number of children below 15 for married individuals -0.1612*** -0.3146*** -0.0507 
 (3.02) (3.10) (0.79) 
Father’s education -0.0205* -0.0335 -0.0184 
 (1.80) (1.64) (1.30) 
Spouse never went to school  -0.1289 -0.1062 -0.1180 
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Table A0 : Probit Estimates of Males and Females' Employment Participation (Contd.) 
 
 
Overall 
sample Males Females 
 (1.29) (0.49) (1.02) 
Spouse has higher education level 0.1597 0.4700* 0.0880 
 (1.53) (1.91) (0.72) 
Spouse is Catholic -0.0083 0.0956 -0.0192 
 (0.09) (0.50) (0.18) 
Spouse is another religion 0.2490 0.7325* 0.1645 
 (1.21) (1.67) (0.65) 
Spouse is Merina 0.0817 -0.2726 0.1284 
 (0.70) (1.29) (0.90) 
Spouse is other ethnic group -0.1333 -0.6147** -0.0081 
 (0.82) (2.19) (0.04) 
    
Housing characteristics    
    
Tenancy -0.1153 -0.3858* -0.0623 
 (1.20) (1.73) (0.57) 
Individual is harboured 0.0947 -0.1633 0.1932 
 (0.82) (0.73) (1.27) 
Receives electricity 0.4775*** 0.7912*** 0.3958*** 
 (4.73) (3.21) (3.41) 
    
Constant -2.5030*** -5.3475*** -1.6718 
 (3.04) (3.82) (1.61) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.38 0.16 
Log pseudo-likelihood -859.82 -213.21 -614.83 
Observations 2339 1148 1187 
Robust z statistics in brackets. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A1 : Earnings Functions for Males 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
 
 OLS OLS OLS 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
 
Age as 
potential 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual 
experience  
+  
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
+  
tenure 
Actual 
experience 
+ tenure  
+ limited 
LFAV 
Actual 
experience + 
‘profession’ 
+  
limited LFAV 
Actual 
experiences  
+  
augmented 
LFAV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
0.0801*** 0.0878*** 0.0886*** 0.0880*** 0.0884*** 0.0854*** 0.0875*** 0.0851*** 0.0852*** 0.0912*** Years of completed schooling 
(13.95) (12.84) (13.54) (12.17) (12.77) (11.82) (12.15) (11.82) (11.83) (11.28) 
0.0083*** _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Age  
(2.68)          
_ 0.0071** _ 0.0067** _ _ 0.0046 _ _ _ Potential years of labour market 
experience   (2.50)  (2.20)   (1.40)    
_ _ 0.0091*** _ 0.0086*** 0.0081*** _ 0.0062* 0.0071** _ Actual years of labour market 
experience   (3.16)  (2.81) (2.58)  (1.85) (2.08)  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0057 Actual years of experience off the 
current employment          (1.60) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0111 0.0114 _ 0.0194** Years of tenure with the current 
employment       (1.25) (1.29)  (1.98) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ -0.0190 -0.0228 _ -0.0284 (Years of tenure with the current 
employment)2/100       (0.64) (0.76)  (0.92) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0162* _ Years of experience in the main 
profession         (1.85)  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.0461 _ (Years of experience in the main 
profession)2/100         (1.56)  
_ _ _ _ _ -0.0122 _ -0.0127 -0.0131 -0.0114 Unemployment spells (in years) 
     (1.18)  (1.21) (1.26) (1.05) 
_ _ _ _ _ -0.0059 _ -0.0065 -0.0063 -0.0063 Total inactivity spells apart from 
unemployment (in years)      (0.92)  (1.01) (0.99) (0.98) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.0405 Total number of work interruptions 
         (0.54) 
(Total number of work 
interruptions)2  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0268* 
          (1.84) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.0061 Total number of work interruptions 
× years of completed schooling          (1.11) 
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 Table A1 : Earnings Functions for Males (Contd.)  
 OLS OLS OLS 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
 
Age as 
potential 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual 
experience  
+  
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
+  
tenure 
Actual 
experience 
+ tenure  
+ limited 
LFAV 
Actual 
experience + 
‘profession’ 
+  
limited LFAV 
Actual 
experiences  
+  
augmented 
LFAV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0420 Proportion of previous experience in the same sector exceeding50% 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise)          (0.66) 
-0.0834* -0.0849* -0.0851* -0.0878* -0.0850* -0.0828* -0.0796 -0.0755 -0.0774 -0.0698 Catholic 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.74) (1.77) (1.77) (1.75) (1.69) (1.65) (1.58) (1.50) (1.55) (1.38) 
-0.1372* -0.1393* -0.1410* -0.1721** -0.1714** -0.1714** -0.1719** -0.1721** -0.1730** -0.1755** Merina 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.87) (1.89) (1.92) (2.05) (2.03) (2.02) (2.04) (2.02) (2.03) (2.06) 
0.2446*** 0.2468*** 0.2376*** 0.2089*** 0.2138*** 0.2242*** 0.2095*** 0.2234*** 0.2196*** 0.2293*** Married 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (3.91) (3.95) (3.81) (3.01) (3.10) (3.28) (3.03) (3.27) (3.21) (3.40) 
0.1705** 0.1712** 0.1722** 0.1676*** 0.1691*** 0.1660*** 0.1513** 0.1508** 0.1741*** 0.1516** Formal training received in the current job (1 if received; 0 
otherwise) (2.36) (2.37) (2.38) (2.76) (2.80) (2.73) (2.52) (2.50) (2.85) (2.53) 
-0.0189*** -0.0190*** -0.0189*** -0.0194*** -0.0193*** -0.0193*** -0.0194*** -0.0193*** -0.0193*** -0.0194*** Number of hours worked per week 
(13.45) (13.59) (13.55) (11.93) (11.88) (11.88) (11.88) (11.84) (11.84) (11.86) 
-0.1166 -0.1216 -0.1138 -0.1210 -0.1146 -0.1222 -0.1060 -0.1093 -0.1050 -0.0923 Short-term contract (CDD) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.18) (1.23) (1.16) (1.43) (1.35) (1.44) (1.26) (1.30) (1.23) (1.10) 
0.0651 0.0644 0.0648 0.0669 0.0671 0.0695 0.0677 0.0694 0.0688 0.0747 Long-term contract (CDI) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.90) (0.89) (0.90) (1.06) (1.07) (1.11) (1.08) (1.11) (1.10) (1.18) 
0.1022 0.0987 0.0988 0.0991** 0.0987** 0.1026** 0.0840* 0.0880* 0.0961* 0.0918* Presence of union in the current job 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.48) (1.42) (1.43) (2.00) (2.01) (2.07) (1.71) (1.78) (1.95) (1.87) 
-0.0706 -0.0760 -0.0678 -0.0621 -0.0560 -0.0625 -0.0357 -0.0382 -0.0517 -0.0252 Formal private wage employment 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.99) (1.07) (0.95) (1.13) (1.03) (1.14) (0.62) (0.67) (0.94) (0.44) 
-0.1871** -0.1977** -0.1885** -0.1877** -0.1799** -0.1831** -0.1603** -0.1598** -0.1751** -0.1476* Self-employment or informal 
sector (1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (2.08) (2.20) (2.10) (2.44) (2.34) (2.39) (2.01) (2.01) (2.27) (1.86) 
_ _ _ -0.1980 -0.1396 -0.1107 -0.1822 -0.1003 -0.0822 -0.0998 IMR males 
   (1.25) (0.88) (0.69) (1.15) (0.62) (0.52) (0.62) 
Constant 0.0372 0.1608 0.1266 0.2636 0.2128 0.2864 0.2205 0.2451 0.2183 0.1947 
 (0.19) (0.91) (0.74) (1.43) (1.17) (1.53) (1.17) (1.28) (1.12) (1.01) 
Observations 1063 1063 1063 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 
R-squared 0.3844 0.3838 0.3860 0.3881 0.3898 0.3910 0.3902 0.3928 0.3931 0.3961 
Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A2: Earnings Functions for Females 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
 
 OLS OLS OLS 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
 
Age as 
potential 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual 
experience  
+  
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
+  
tenure 
Actual 
experience 
+ tenure  
+ limited 
LFAV 
Actual 
experience + 
‘profession’ 
+  
limited LFAV 
Actual 
experiences  
+  
augmented 
LFAV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
0.1041*** 0.1219*** 0.1091*** 0.1214*** 0.1110*** 0.1196*** 0.1209*** 0.1192*** 0.1188*** 0.0992*** Years of completed schooling 
(14.00) (13.68) (14.06) (11.76) (12.19) (11.65) (11.93) (11.78) (11.72) (8.28) 
0.0169*** _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Age  
(5.07)          
_ 0.0160*** _ 0.0151*** _ _ 0.0129*** _ _ _ Potential years of labour market 
experience   (5.13)  (4.18)   (3.31)    
_ _ 0.0134*** _ 0.0150*** 0.0172*** _ 0.0145*** 0.0163*** _ Actual years of labour market 
experience   (4.95)  (4.01) (4.39)  (3.33) (3.71)  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0119** Actual years of experience off the 
current employment          (2.46) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0418*** 0.0415*** _ 0.0560*** Years of tenure with the current 
employment       (4.02) (3.97)  (5.07) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ -0.1287*** -0.1290*** _ -0.1375*** (Years of tenure with the current 
employment)2/100       (3.35) (3.29)  (3.49) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0398*** _ Years of experience in the main 
profession         (3.92)  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.1337*** _ (Years of experience in the main 
profession)2/100         (3.70)  
_ _ _ _ _ 0.0036 _ 0.0021 0.0036 -0.0036 Unemployment spells (in years) 
     (0.28)  (0.16) (0.28) (0.28) 
_ _ _ _ _ 0.0078** _ 0.0069* 0.0078** 0.0055 Total inactivity spells apart from 
unemployment (in years)      (1.97)  (1.73) (1.98) (1.40) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -0.1965* Total number of work interruptions 
         (1.95) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0347* (Total number of work 
interruptions)2          (1.78) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0212** Total number of work interruptions 
× years of completed schooling           (2.57) 
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Table A2: Earnings Functions for Females (Contd.) 
 
 OLS OLS OLS 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
OLS with 
Selectivity 
correction 
 
Age as 
potential 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual 
experience  
+  
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
+  
tenure 
Actual 
experience 
+ tenure  
+ limited 
LFAV 
Actual 
experience + 
‘profession’ 
+  
limited LFAV 
Actual 
experiences  
+  
augmented 
LFAV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.0018 Proportion of previous experience in the same sector exceeding 
50% (1 if yes; 0 otherwise)          (0.03) 
0.0396 0.0411 0.0380 0.0343 0.0325 0.0317 0.0470 0.0441 0.0304 0.0392 Catholic 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.74) (0.76) (0.71) (0.63) (0.60) (0.58) (0.88) (0.83) (0.57) (0.74) 
-0.1216 -0.1330 -0.1182 -0.1558* -0.1089 -0.1232 -0.1443 -0.1182 -0.1209 -0.1159 Merina 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.38) (1.51) (1.34) (1.67) (1.16) (1.33) (1.57) (1.29) (1.33) (1.26) 
0.1581*** 0.1543*** 0.1644*** 0.1800*** 0.1469** 0.1557*** 0.1558*** 0.1369** 0.1403** 0.1468*** Married 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (2.90) (2.83) (3.01) (3.27) (2.57) (2.77) (2.88) (2.48) (2.52) (2.69) 
0.0875 0.0933 0.0671 0.0883 0.0642 0.0764 0.0520 0.0438 0.0744 0.0530 Formal training received in the current job (1 if received; 0 
otherwise) (0.90) (0.96) (0.69) (1.49) (1.11) (1.30) (0.90) (0.76) (1.33) (0.93) 
-0.0173*** -0.0173*** -0.0180*** -0.0172*** -0.0178*** -0.0177*** -0.0172*** -0.0176*** -0.0180*** -0.0177*** Number of hours worked per week 
(11.40) (11.43) (11.83) (10.31) (10.62) (10.52) (10.42) (10.56) (10.82) (10.50) 
-0.0119 -0.0225 -0.0316 -0.0221 -0.0427 -0.0259 0.0059 0.0030 0.0233 0.0056 Short-term contract (CDD) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.08) (0.16) (0.22) (0.17) (0.32) (0.20) (0.04) (0.02) (0.18) (0.04) 
-0.0587 -0.0694 -0.0657 -0.0765 -0.0718 -0.0721 -0.0950 -0.0901 -0.0602 -0.0779 Long-term contract (CDI) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.67) (0.79) (0.75) (1.07) (1.01) (1.02) (1.33) (1.27) (0.85) (1.09) 
0.1179 0.1230 0.1115 0.1146** 0.1128** 0.1132** 0.1141** 0.1131** 0.1103** 0.1208** Presence of union in the current job 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.35) (1.41) (1.27) (2.12) (2.09) (2.11) (2.14) (2.12) (2.06) (2.25) 
-0.1453 -0.1488* -0.1675* -0.1346** -0.1672*** -0.1379** -0.0767 -0.0811 -0.0991 -0.1019* Formal private wage employment 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.64) (1.68) (1.91) (2.18) (2.82) (2.25) (1.22) (1.30) (1.59) (1.65) 
-0.6328*** -0.6497*** -0.6552*** -0.6364*** -0.6586*** -0.6365*** -0.5797*** -0.5810*** -0.5835*** -0.6029*** Self-employment or informal 
sector (1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (5.74) (5.93) (5.98) (6.99) (7.32) (7.06) (6.33) (6.42) (6.40) (6.62) 
_ _ _ -0.1989 0.0682 -0.0161 -0.1290 0.0139 0.0097 -0.0264 IMR females 
   (1.49) (0.41) (0.10) (0.94) (0.08) (0.06) (0.16) 
Constant -0.6291*** -0.4412** -0.1649 -0.3404 -0.2377 -0.4148* -0.5195** -0.5716** -0.5856** -0.3558 
 (2.65) (2.08) (0.88) (1.52) (1.12) (1.78) (2.32) (2.45) (2.51) (1.48) 
Observations 827 827 827 823 823 823 823 823 823 823 
R-squared 0.5101 0.5105 0.5095 0.5134 0.5106 0.5133 0.5248 0.5244 0.5243 0.5294 
Absolute value of t statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Multinomial Logit Sectoral Choice Models 
 
  Males    Females  
 
Public wage 
employment 
Formal 
private wage 
employment 
Self-employed 
or informal 
sector 
 Public wage 
employment 
Formal 
private wage 
employment 
Self-employed 
or informal 
sector 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Individual characteristics        
Age 1.0312*** 0.6164*** 0.6376***  0.7480*** 0.2193* 0.1167 
 (5.06) (3.46) (3.48)  (3.88) (1.85) (1.11) 
(Age)2 -0.0142*** -0.0102*** -0.0105***  -0.0095*** -0.0041*** -0.0022* 
 (5.50) (4.41) (4.43)  (4.09) (2.75) (1.67) 
Catholic 0.4982 0.7341** 0.4920  0.1185 0.1025 0.2154 
 (1.26) (1.97) (1.29)  (0.36) (0.43) (1.00) 
Other religion 0.0755 0.5080 1.2948  -0.5562 -0.3569 -0.9589 
 (0.07) (0.48) (1.25)  (0.66) (0.55) (1.45) 
Merina 0.6668 0.8649* 1.0744**  0.8559* 0.7431** 0.3962 
 (1.39) (1.92) (2.27)  (1.92) (2.22) (1.34) 
Household head 2.3087*** 1.3633*** 1.6183***  2.0721** 1.6474*** 0.2021 
 (3.68) (2.61) (2.90)  (2.51) (3.27) (0.46) 
Head’s spouse -8.3198 18.9555 19.5451***  0.9501 0.7278 -0.3889 
 (0.00) (.) (14.84)  (1.18) (1.60) (1.01) 
Head’s children -0.6321 -0.5832 -0.0220  1.4936* 1.0734** -0.1333 
 (0.90) (1.17) (0.04)  (1.83) (2.33) (0.32) 
Head’s parent -0.0112 29.6318 -1.4485  -41.8048 0.9481 -47.2024 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (.) (0.70) (.) 
Married 2.6763*** 2.1892*** 2.0227***  1.1475** 0.1925 -0.2701 
 (4.03) (3.52) (3.18)  (2.22) (0.50) (0.74) 
Married before first employment 0.7320 0.3953 1.0187  1.0908*** 1.1458*** 0.9390*** 
 (0.89) (0.49) (1.25)  (3.39) (4.43) (3.74) 
Years of completed schooling 0.1619*** 0.0640 -0.0145  0.4049*** 0.0975*** -0.0526 
 (2.68) (1.12) (0.25)  (8.38) (2.84) (1.62) 
Total actual labour market experience 0.1895*** 0.1855*** 0.2023***  0.1676*** 0.1117*** 0.0867*** 
 (4.89) (5.01) (5.38)  (8.53) (8.76) (8.27) 
Household characteristics        
Household’s income per capita  -0.0017 -0.0029** -0.0053***  -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0010 
 (1.28) (2.31) (2.82)  (1.44) (1.37) (1.26) 
Proxy of material wealth 0.3076*** 0.3914*** 0.1496  -0.0539 0.0061 -0.0642 
 (3.18) (4.26) (1.48)  (0.90) (0.15) (1.30) 
Inverse dependency ratio 3.1249*** 3.6185*** 2.6837***  -0.7121 0.4698 0.3636 
 (3.18) (3.90) (2.78)  (0.89) (0.79) (0.64) 
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Table A3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Multinomial Logit Sectoral Choice Models (Contd.) 
 
Number of children between 0 and 4 years old  0.8934*** 0.6384** 0.6321**  0.0930 -0.4081** -0.1245 
 (2.82) (2.14) (2.11)  (0.36) (2.13) (0.78) 
Number of children between 5 and 9 years old  0.2453 -0.1108 -0.0430  0.2946 0.0026 0.1313 
 (0.96) (0.46) (0.18)  (1.29) (0.01) (0.87) 
Number of children between 10 and 14 years old  0.5402** 0.3092 0.2668  0.6137*** -0.0009 0.1154 
 (2.21) (1.33) (1.14)  (2.72) (0.01) (0.75) 
Number of children below 15 for married individuals -0.7967*** -0.5120** -0.6144**  -0.5251** -0.0645 0.0217 
 (3.15) (2.13) (2.54)  (2.51) (0.40) (0.16) 
Father’s education -0.1088** -0.0909* -0.0787  -0.0364 -0.0350 -0.0619** 
 (2.19) (1.93) (1.58)  (0.92) (1.14) (1.99) 
Spouse never went to school  -0.4892 -0.4167 -0.3310  -1.2075*** -0.5605** -0.1181 
 (0.94) (0.83) (0.65)  (2.66) (2.09) (0.54) 
Spouse has higher education level 0.8185 0.7003 1.0302  -0.1661 -0.2498 -0.4719* 
 (1.30) (1.14) (1.60)  (0.51) (0.94) (1.66) 
Spouse is Catholic 0.8007 0.2496 0.5083  -0.0170 -0.2748 -0.3424 
 (1.62) (0.52) (1.04)  (0.05) (1.10) (1.55) 
Spouse is another religion 0.9524 1.2147 0.9315  1.2347* 0.2557 0.3521 
 (0.69) (0.90) (0.68)  (1.73) (0.40) (0.62) 
Spouse is Merina -1.8349*** -0.6307 -1.3557**  -0.4750 0.1106 0.0859 
 (2.98) (1.07) (2.27)  (1.15) (0.34) (0.29) 
Spouse is other ethnic group -1.7637** -0.7950 -1.7579**  -0.4369 -0.0153 -0.0306 
 (2.20) (1.02) (2.16)  (0.75) (0.03) (0.07) 
Housing characteristics        
Tenancy -0.1335 -0.3189 -0.2288  0.0461 -0.4979* -0.3666 
 (0.24) (0.58) (0.41)  (0.14) (1.96) (1.62) 
Individual is harboured -0.1157 0.0001 -0.1549  0.8283* 0.5903* 0.1230 
 (0.21) (0.00) (0.28)  (1.90) (1.68) (0.36) 
Receives electricity 1.6321*** 1.7669*** 2.2651***  0.0582 -0.2505 0.5930*** 
 (2.81) (3.18) (4.11)  (0.15) (0.94) (2.67) 
        
Constant -24.6116*** -12.9936*** -12.2550***  -23.0319*** -5.1716** -0.9613 
 (6.10) (3.84) (3.50)  (5.66) (2.24) (0.47) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.22    0.25  
Log pseudo-likelihood  -1142.73    -1179.26  
Observations 1152 1152 1152  1187 1187 1187 
The reference group is non-participation in paid employment. Robust z statistics in brackets. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table A4 : Selectivity Corrected Log Earnings Functions Across Sectors for Males 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
 
 Public wage employment Formal private wage employment Self-employed or informal sector 
 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV 
 
0.0658*** 0.0684*** 0.0578*** 0.1029*** 0.0998*** 0.0999*** 0.0180 0.0243 0.0161 Years of completed schooling 
(4.73) (5.32) (4.20) (8.20) (7.97) (7.74) (0.85) (1.20) (0.75) 
0.0101* _ _ 0.0229*** _ _ -0.0069 _ _ Potential years of experience  
(1.88)   (4.70)   (1.41)   
_ 0.0132*** 0.0114** _ 0.0241*** 0.0237*** _ -0.0039 -0.0057 Actual years of experience 
 (2.71) (2.23)  (4.65) (4.45)  (0.81) (1.13) 
_ _ -0.0249* _ _ -0.0088 _ _ -0.0238 Unemployment years  
(in years)   (1.77)   (0.43)   (1.63) 
_ _ -0.0130 _ _ 0.0017 _ _ -0.0100 Total inactivity years apart from 
unemployment (in years)   (1.49)   (0.17)   (0.84) 
-0.1286** -0.1185* -0.1156* -0.0998 -0.1149 -0.1175 -0.0594 -0.0634 -0.0598 Catholic 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (2.08) (1.92) (1.88) (1.24) (1.44) (1.46) (0.65) (0.69) (0.65) 
-0.0270 -0.0347 -0.0290 -0.2110 -0.2179 -0.2125 -0.1423 -0.1519 -0.1338 Merina 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.31) (0.39) (0.32) (1.43) (1.48) (1.42) (0.81) (0.87) (0.75) 
-0.0027 -0.0008 0.0025 0.0411 0.0509 0.0475 0.2225** 0.2195** 0.2098* Married 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.38) (0.48) (0.44) (2.08) (2.05) (1.94) 
0.2238*** 0.2282*** 0.2154*** 0.0623 0.0780 0.0781 0.3333* 0.3446* 0.3242* Formal training received in the current job 
(1 if received; 0 otherwise) (3.58) (3.62) (3.45) (0.50) (0.63) (0.63) (1.77) (1.83) (1.71) 
-0.0231*** -0.0227*** -0.0222*** -0.0213*** -0.0221*** -0.0221*** -0.0173*** -0.0173*** -0.0173*** Number of hours worked per week 
(8.68) (8.60) (8.51) (6.17) (6.24) (6.24) (7.97) (7.96) (7.97) 
-0.0240 -0.0097 -0.0180 -0.0268 -0.0210 -0.0244 -0.0825 -0.0762 -0.1063 Short-term contract (CDD) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.19) (0.08) (0.14) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.31) (0.28) (0.39) 
0.2039*** 0.2043*** 0.2041** 0.0317 0.0336 0.0351 -0.0889 -0.0917 -0.0544 Long-term contract (CDI) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (2.62) (2.63) (2.57) (0.34) (0.36) (0.37) (0.61) (0.62) (0.38) 
0.1250* 0.1227* 0.1303** -0.0035 0.0051 0.0047 0.2054 0.1460 0.2206 Presence of union in the current job 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise)  (1.92) (1.94) (2.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (1.44) (1.13) (1.27) 
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Table A4 : Selectivity Corrected Log Earnings Functions Across Sectors for Males (Contd.) 
 
-1.2257** -1.0796** -1.3276*** _ _ _ _ _ _ 
publicm ,λ  (2.40) (2.12) (2.63)       
_ _ _ -1.4457** -1.4176** -1.4160** _ _ _ 
formalm ,λ  
   (2.42) (2.33) (2.30)    
_ _ _ _ _ _ 2.7155*** 2.6216*** 2.7475*** 
ormalm inf,λ  
      (3.97) (3.90) (4.01) 
1.2064** 1.0225** 1.3919*** 0.8192 0.8866* 0.8921* -0.7792** -0.8420*** -0.7343** Constant 
(2.34) (2.09) (2.75) (1.62) (1.75) (1.76) (2.41) (2.59) (2.25) 
          
Observations 270 270 270 321 321 321 460 460 460 
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.30 
Robust t statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A5 : Selectivity Corrected Log Earnings Functions Across Sectors 
for Females 
Dependent variable: Log hourly earnings 
 
 Public wage employment Formal private wage employment Self-employed or informal sector 
 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV 
 
0.0814*** 0.0846*** 0.0892*** 0.1289*** 0.1138*** 0.1267*** 0.0868*** 0.0629*** 0.0619** Years of completed schooling 
(4.77) (4.84) (4.96) (7.08) (7.03) (7.06) (3.51) (2.86) (2.35) 
0.0100* _ _ 0.0265*** _ _ 0.0112** _ _ Potential years of experience  
(1.96)   (4.96)   (2.13)   
_ 0.0131** 0.0157*** _ 0.0230*** 0.0268*** _ 0.0135*** 0.0130** Actual years of experience 
 (2.46) (2.71)  (5.01) (5.43)  (3.32) (2.49) 
_ _ 0.0214* _ _ 0.0101 _ _ -0.0047 Unemployment years  
(in years)   (1.88)   (0.36)   (0.29) 
_ _ 0.0003 _ _ 0.0156** _ _ -0.0005 Total inactivity years apart from 
unemployment (in years)   (0.05)   (2.18)   (0.09) 
-0.0242 -0.0150 -0.0092 0.1582* 0.1301 0.1462 0.0355 0.0546 0.0546 Catholic 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.39) (0.25) (0.15) (1.66) (1.34) (1.51) (0.41) (0.64) (0.64) 
0.0855 0.0780 0.0541 -0.0108 -0.0062 -0.0114 -0.2149 -0.1891 -0.1885 Merina 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (0.92) (0.80) (0.52) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (1.51) (1.32) (1.31) 
0.1315** 0.1130* 0.1107* 0.1270 0.1588* 0.1294 0.1136 0.1100 0.1084 Married 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (2.31) (1.96) (1.92) (1.52) (1.91) (1.55) (1.41) (1.36) (1.36) 
0.0681 0.0455 0.0472 0.1320 0.1077 0.1047 0.2252 0.2160 0.2194 Formal training received in the current job 
(1 if received; 0 otherwise) (1.05) (0.70) (0.73) (1.31) (1.10) (1.06) (1.18) (1.40) (1.37) 
-0.0352*** -0.0356*** -0.0357*** -0.0159*** -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0154*** -0.0161*** -0.0162*** Number of hours worked per week 
(8.21) (8.28) (8.23) (3.89) (3.90) (3.91) (8.06) (8.40) (8.39) 
0.1314 0.1488 0.1506 -0.0730 -0.0919 -0.0658 0.6921** 0.6426** 0.6375** Short-term contract (CDD) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.01) (1.13) (1.13) (0.35) (0.44) (0.33) (2.30) (2.11) (2.06) 
0.1134 0.1287 0.1094 -0.0722 -0.0937 -0.0739 -0.2344 -0.1641 -0.1576 Long-term contract (CDI) 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise) (1.26) (1.47) (1.25) (0.75) (0.97) (0.77) (1.09) (0.90) (0.86) 
0.2257*** 0.2281*** 0.2391*** -0.0356 -0.0618 -0.0493 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Presence of union in the current job 
(1 if yes; 0 otherwise)  (3.45) (3.48) (3.55) (0.48) (0.82) (0.67) (.) (.) (.) 
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Table A5 : Selectivity Corrected Log Earnings Functions Across Sectors for Females (Contd.) 
 
 Public wage employment Formal private wage employment Self-employed or informal sector 
 
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV
Potential 
experience 
Actual 
experience 
Actual + 
limited LFAV 
-0.2934 -0.0338 0.0832 _ _ _ _ _ _ 
publicm ,λ  
(0.79) (0.08) (0.19)       
_ _ _ -0.7768 -0.2734 -0.6406 _ _ _ 
formalm ,λ  
   (1.30) (0.46) (1.03)    
_ _ _ _ _ _ 1.3980** 2.0645*** 2.0752*** 
ormalm inf,λ  
      (2.27) (3.32) (3.22) 
0.6366 0.4500 0.2934 -0.5525 -0.5071 -0.6075 -1.4409*** -1.5802*** -1.5599*** Constant 
(1.39) (0.93) (0.58) (1.00) (0.91) (1.09) (4.40) (5.18) (4.64) 
          
Observations 148 148 148 232 232 232 443 443 443 
R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Robust t statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * mean respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A6: Overview of Gender Earnings Decompositions Using Alternative Decomposition Techniques and Non-Selectivity Corrected Earnings Models 
 
Earnings Functions 
Oaxaca (1973) 
Blinder (1973)* Reimers (1983) Cotton (1988) 
Neumark (1988) 
Oaxaca and Ransom 
(1994)** 
with % unexplained % explained
% 
unexplained % explained
% 
unexplained % explained
% 
unexplained % explained
Potential experience 
+  
limited control variables a 88.6 11.4 82.8 17.2 83.5 16.5 77.5 22.5 
 Total actual experience 
+ 
 limited control variables  76.1 23.9 69.0 31.0 69.8 30.2 61.3 38.7 
Total actual experience 
+ limited LFAV 
+ limited control variables  71.9 28.1 69.1 30.9 69.5 30.5 56.2 43.8 
Segmented actual experience  (experience off the job + 
tenure) 
+ limited LFAV 
+ limited control variables 
72.8 27.2 70.0 30.0 70.3 29.7 56.3 43.7 
Segmented actual experience  (other experience + 
experience of the main profession) 
+ limited LFAV 
+ limited control variables 
72.1 27.9 69.5 30.5 69.8 30.2 56.1 43.9 
Segmented actual experience  (experience off the job + 
tenure) 
+ augmented LFAV 
+ limited control variables 
70.2 29.8 67.2 32.8 67.5 32.5 54.6 45.4 
Segmented actual experience  (experience off the job + 
tenure) 
+ augmented LFAV  
+ augmented control variables b 
61.1 38.9 47.0 53.0 48.8 51.2 29.5 70.5 
Notes: *: the male earnings are taken as the non-discriminatory structure (Ω=1).  **: pooled model for both sexes. a: this includes education plus all control variables introduced in models 1 to 5 of Tables A1 and A2 minus 
CDD, CDI, the dummy for union and the sectoral dummies. b: this includes the limited control variables plus CDD, CDI, a dummy for union, 9 industry and 7 occupational dummies. 
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Table A7: The Oaxaca and Neumark Decompositions Using Selectivity Corrected Earnings 
Models 
 
Gender earnings gap decompositions Earnings model with potential experience 
Earnings model with segmented 
actual experience  
+ augmented LFAV 
Oaxaca’s decomposition*   
Differences   
Due to characteristics (E) 0.040 0.116 
Due to returns to characteristics (C) -0.806 -0.811 
Shift in constant coefficients (U) 1.079 1.069 
Selectivity (S) 0.105 0.044 
Raw differential (R): E+C+U+S 0.418 0.418 
Due to discrimination (D): C+U 0.273 0.258 
Effect of selectivity as % total (S/R) 25.09 10.51 
Endowments as % total (E/R) 9.61 27.74 
Discrimination as % total (D/R) 65.30 61.75 
Total 100 100 
 
Neumark’s decomposition   
Differences    
Due to characteristics (E) 0.078 0.137 
Due to deviation of male returns (C1) 0.015 0.026 
Due to deviation of female returns (C2) 0.220 0.211 
Selectivity (S) 0.105 0.044 
Raw differential (R): E+C1+C2+S 0.418 0.418 
Due to discrimination (D): C1+C2 0.235 0.237 
Effect of selectivity as % total (S/R) 25.09 10.51 
Endowments as % total (E/R) 18.60 32.85 
Discrimination as % total (D/R) 56.31 56.64 
Total 100 100 
*: the male earnings are taken as the non-discriminatory structure (Ω=1). Positive sign indicates advantage to males;  
negative sign indicates advantage to females.  
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Table A8: The Oaxaca and Neumark Decompositions by Sector Using Selectivity Corrected Earnings Models 
 
Gender earnings gap decompositions Public wage employment Formal private wage employment 
Self-employed or informal 
sector 
Oaxaca’s decomposition*    
Differences    
Due to characteristics (E) -0.124 0.039 0.019 
Due to returns to characteristics (C) -0.237 -1.065 -0.694 
Shift in constant coefficients (U) 1.009 1.516 0.727 
Selectivity (S) -0.915 -0.304 0.421 
Raw differential (R): E+C+U+S -0.267 0.186 0.473 
Due to discrimination (D): C+U 0.771 0.451 0.033 
Effect of selectivity as % total (S/R) 341.95 -163.59 88.92 
Endowments as % total (E/R) 46.40 20.84 4.02 
Discrimination as % total (D/R) -288.36 242.75 7.05 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Neumark’s decomposition    
Differences     
Due to characteristics (E) -0.155 0.043 0.228 
Due to deviation of male returns (C1) 0.154 0.177 -1.523 
Due to deviation of female returns (C2) 0.648 0.270 1.348 
Selectivity (S) -0.915 -0.304 0.421 
Raw differential (R): E+C1+C2+S -0.267 0.186 0.473 
Due to discrimination (D): C1+C2 0.802 0.447 -0.176 
Effect of selectivity as % total (S/R) 341.95 -163.59 88.92 
Endowments as % total (E/R) 57.92 22.89 48.19 
Discrimination as % total (D/R) -299.87 240.70 -37.12 
Total 100 100 100 
These decompositions stem from earnings regressions that include actual experience variables (tenure and previous experience) and limited LFAVs. 
*: the male earnings are taken as the non-discriminatory structure (Ω=1). Positive sign indicates advantage to males; negative sign indicates advantage to females. 
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Table A9 : Full Decomposition of Gender Earnings Gap Accounting for Selectivity 
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-0.087 
 
-36.4% 
 
Sub-total 
 
-0.569 
 
Earnings differences due to between-sectoral location attributable to 
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∑∑
==
−+−
3
1
**
3
1
** )()(
j
fjjfj
j
jmjmj ppWppW  
 
 
0.057 
 
 
23.7% 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on male sectoral location 
∑
=
−
3
1
* )(
j
mjmjmj ppW  0.729 
 
 
303.4% 
Deviation in effect of characteristics on female sectoral location 
 )(
3
1
*∑
=
−
j
fjfjfj ppW  
0.023 9.8% 
 
Sub-total 0.809  
 
Total 0.240 100% 
These decompositions stem from earnings regressions that include actual experience variables (tenure and previous experience) and limited 
LFAVs. 
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